דף 143

and he nodded [vekharkeish] his head in the study hall in approval of this explanation. Rabbi Yirmeya went to Rabbi Avin, who said to him: Rabbi Abbahu’s reasoning is that if a father said to his son: Acquire an item as a donkey does, does he acquire it? In the same manner that the son would not acquire anything if his acquisition were likened to that of a donkey, which possesses no ability to acquire an item, so too, since the father compared the son’s acquisition to the acquisition effected by his unborn children, who possess no ability to acquire property, the son did not acquire any property.

This is as it was stated: With regard to one who says to another: Acquire an item as a donkey does, he does not acquire any property, as a donkey cannot acquire property. But with regard to one who says: You and a donkey shall both acquire my property, there is a disagreement. Rav Naḥman says: The person acquires his half of the property, and Rav Hamnuna says: It is as though the giver does not say anything. Since the beneficiary was included with the donkey in the same acquisition, he does not acquire any property, just as the donkey does not acquire any property. Rav Sheshet says: The person acquires all the property. As the giver knew that a donkey cannot acquire property, he intended for the person, who was capable of acquiring property, to acquire all the property.

Rav Sheshet said: From where do I say this? As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei says: There is nothing bitter in the cucumber other than its inner part, which is sometimes bitter and inedible and unfit to be separated as teruma. Therefore, since one does not know if the cucumber he separates as teruma is bitter inside, when he separates teruma, he adds part of another cucumber as teruma, in addition to the outer part of the cucumber, which is edible. And he separates both as teruma, thereby ensuring that the teruma consists of sufficient edible cucumber.

Rav Sheshet asks: Why does the separation of teruma take effect? Is it not analogous to one who states: You and a donkey shall acquire an item, since he designated as teruma both the outer part of the cucumber, which is fit to become teruma, and the inedible inner part, which is not fit to become teruma? Since this does not invalidate the separation of teruma with regard to the edible outer part, one can infer that although the donkey cannot acquire property, this does not prevent the person from acquiring the property.

The Gemara replies: It is different there, as by Torah law the bitter inner part is also properly considered teruma, even though by rabbinic law if one separated inferior produce as teruma he must again separate produce of superior quality as teruma. Therefore, when one designates the entire cucumber as teruma, he is not designating both fit and unfit produce.

This is as Rabbi Ile’a says: From where is it derived that the halakha with regard to one who separates teruma from poor-quality produce for superior-quality produce is that his teruma is valid teruma? It is as it is stated with regard to teruma: “And you shall bear no sin by reason of it, seeing that you have set apart from it the best thereof” (Numbers 18:32). By inference, this indicates that it is a transgression to separate the inferior part of the produce as teruma. Rabbi Ile’a explains the proof: And if the inferior produce is not sanctified as teruma, why does it involve the bearing of sin, as it is a meaningless act? From here one can derive that that the halakha with regard to one who separates teruma from poor-quality produce for superior-quality produce is that although he acted improperly, his teruma is valid teruma.

§ The Gemara cited Rav Hamnuna’s opinion that if one says: You and a donkey shall acquire my property, he did not say anything. Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: Rav Avya raises an objection to Rav Hamnuna’s opinion from a mishna (Kiddushin 50b): An incident occurred involving five women, and among them were two sisters, and one person gathered a basket of figs that belonged to them, and the fruit was of the Sabbatical Year, and he said: You are hereby all betrothed to me with this basket, and one of them accepted it on behalf of all of them. The Sages said: The sisters are not betrothed, as it is prohibited to marry the sister of one’s wife during her lifetime.

One can infer from the mishna: It is only the sisters who are not betrothed, but the unrelated women are betrothed. But why is that so? It is analogous to one who states: You and a donkey shall acquire an item. Since he tried to betroth two women ineligible for betrothal together with the eligible women, the betrothal should not take effect even with regard to the eligible women.

Rav Ashi said to Rav Mordekhai: This is why I saw Rav Huna bar Avya in a dream, because you were going to tell me that Rav Avya raised an objection to Rav Hamnuna’s opinion. But as for this objection, didn’t we interpret the mishna in Kiddushin as referring to where he says: Those of you who are eligible for engaging in sexual intercourse with me shall be betrothed to me? Since the sisters were forbidden to him, they were not included in the betrothal in the first place, and there was no impediment to the betrothal of the eligible women taking effect. The case is therefore not comparable to the case discussed by Rav Hamnuna.

§ The Gemara relates: There was a certain man who said to his wife: My property is given to you and to your sons. Rav Yosef says: In such a case, the wife acquires half of the property, even though the man did not specify how much of his property he was giving her. And Rav Yosef said: From where do I say this? As it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: The verse states with regard to the shewbread: “And it shall be for Aaron and his sons” (Leviticus 24:9). This means half for Aaron and half for his sons. One can infer from the baraita that when it is specified that a gift is to be divided between an individual and a group, the intention is that the individual receives half.

Abaye said to Rav Yosef: Granted, there, in the case of the shewbread, Aaron is eligible to receive a share of the shewbread as a priest; it is for this reason that the Merciful One specified him separately, so that he should take more than other priests, i.e., half. But with regard to a woman, who is not eligible to inherit her husband’s property, it is sufficient for her to receive a portion of the inheritance as one of the sons, not half of all the property.

The Gemara raises an objection: Is that so? But there was an incident in Neharde’a where a man gave a gift to an individual and to a group of people, and Shmuel collected half the sum for the individual. There was a similar case in Tiberias, and Rabbi Yoḥanan collected half the sum for the individual. And furthermore, when Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef came from Eretz Yisrael he said: There was a certain coronation tax that was placed by the royal house on the city councilmen [a’abulei] and on the prominent citizens [ve’a’isterugei]. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: Let the city councilmen give half and the prominent citizens half. This indicates that when two groups are mentioned together, the intent is that each one represents half.

The Gemara rejects this argument: How can the case concerning the tax be compared to the other cases? There, initially, when they would write the writ of assessment, they would write that it was placed on the city councilmen alone. And the prominent citizens would assist them in raising the sum, and the king knew that they were assisting them. Therefore, now, the meaning of what they wrote: It is placed on the city councilmen and on the prominent citizens, is to say that these should give half of the tax, and those should give half.

Rabbi Zeira raises an objection to Rav Yosef’s ruling from a baraita (Tosefta, Menaḥot 12:7): With regard to one who says: It is incumbent upon me to bring a meal-offering of one hundred tenths of an ephah in two vessels, he brings sixty-tenths in one vessel, and the remaining forty-tenths in one vessel, as no more than sixty-tenths may be brought in a single vessel.