דף 17

GEMARA: The Gemara analyzes the mishna: Ravina said to Rava: In the context of the category of Trampling, damage caused by an animal trampling an object with its foot is the same as damage caused by an animal breaking an object with its body. Why does the mishna repeat the same halakha twice? Rava said to him: First, the tanna teaches the primary categories of damage, namely the category of Trampling with an animal’s foot, which is mentioned explicitly in the Torah, and then he teaches the subcategories of those primary categories, i.e., the animal is deemed forewarned with regard to causing damage with other parts of its body in the course of its walking.

Ravina challenges this explanation: If that is so, the latter clause of the mishna (19b), which teaches, concerning the primary category of Eating: For what damage caused by Eating is the animal deemed forewarned? It is deemed forewarned with regard to eating food items fit for its consumption, i.e., the animal is deemed forewarned with regard to eating fruits and vegetables. Ravina asks: What primary categories and what subcategories are there in that context? No subcategories of Eating are enumerated there, and nevertheless, the phrase: The animal is deemed forewarned, is repeated. Rava responded to Ravina with a humorous response and said to him: I resolved the difficulty in one mishna, now you resolve the difficulty in one mishna.

And what is the reason for the apparent redundancy in the mishna with regard to Eating? Rav Ashi said: First the tanna teaches the halakha of Eating by an undomesticated animal and then he teaches the halakha of Eating by a domesticated animal. And it was necessary to state both, as it enters your mind to say that since it is written: “And he set his animal loose” (Exodus 22:4), with regard to domesticated animals, yes, the primary category of Eating applies, but with regard to undomesticated animals, no, the primary category of Eating does not apply. Therefore, the tanna teaches us that undomesticated animals are included in the category of domesticated animals in this regard and the owner of an undomesticated animal is liable for damage caused by his animal eating another person’s produce.

The Gemara asks: If so, the tanna should have taught the halakha with regard to a domesticated animal first and only afterward taught the halakha with regard to an undomesticated animal, as the latter is included in the category of the former. The Gemara answers: On the contrary, that halakha, which is derived from an interpretation, is dear to him, and therefore the tanna preferred to begin with the derived halakha and only then proceed to the explicit halakha.

The Gemara asks: If so, then with regard to the first clause, in this mishna too, let the tanna teach that which is not explicitly written first, as that which is derived from an interpretation is dear to him. The Gemara distinguishes between the cases: How can they be compared? There, with regard to Eating, this damage caused by a domesticated animal and that damage caused by an undomesticated animal are primary categories of damage; therefore, the tanna taught first that halakha, which is derived from an interpretation, is dear to him. But here, with regard to Trampling, would he leave aside the primary category of Trampling, done with the animal’s foot, and teach a subcategory first?

If you wish, say instead that the reason that in this mishna the tanna begins with that which is written explicitly in the Torah and only then proceeds to teach that which is derived through an interpretation is as follows: Since the tanna concluded the discussion in the final mishna in the previous chapter (15b) with the primary category of Trampling by teaching the clause: The foot of an animal is deemed forewarned with regard to trampling objects and breaking them in the course of its walking, therefore, he began the first mishna in the second chapter with the primary category of Trampling.

§ The Sages taught: An animal is deemed forewarned with regard to walking in its typical manner and, while doing so, breaking objects in the course of its walking. How so? If an animal entered into the courtyard of the injured party and it damaged an object with its body in the course of its walking; or if it caused damage with its hair in the course of its walking; or with the saddle that is on it; or with the packed saddlebag [shalif ] that is on it; or with the halter in its mouth; or with the bell [zog] around its neck; or if it was a donkey that caused damage with its burden; in all these cases the owner pays the full cost of the damage. Sumakhos says: In the case of pebbles propelled by an animal in the course of its walking, or in the case of a pig that was burrowing in the garbage heap and caused damage, the owner of the animal pays the full cost of the damage.

The Gemara asks: If a pig caused damage, it is obvious that its owner must pay the full cost of the damage. What novel element is Sumakhos introducing? The Gemara answers: Rather, say: If it propelled pebbles and thereby caused damage, the owner pays the full cost of the damage.

The Gemara asks: Pebbles, who mentioned anything about it? The Gemara answers: The baraita is incomplete and this is what it is teaching: For damage caused by pebbles that were propelled by animals walking in their typical manner, the owner pays half the cost of the damage, and for damage caused by a pig that was burrowing in the garbage heap and propelled pebbles and that damaged an object, its owner pays half the cost of the damage. Sumakhos says: Both in the case of pebbles that were propelled and in the case of a pig that was burrowing in the garbage heap and propelled pebbles and damaged an object, the owner pays the full cost of the damage. Sumakhos does not accept the halakha that the owner pays only half the cost of the damage caused by pebbles inadvertently propelled by the foot of an animal in the course of its walking, i.e., in its typical manner. He holds that since the damage results from the animal’s typical behavior, the owner pays the full cost of the damage.

The Sages taught (Tosefta 2:1): If chickens were flying from place to place and broke vessels with their wings, their owner pays the full cost of the damage as this is a subcategory of Trampling. By contrast, if the damage was caused by the wind generated by their wings, the owner pays half the cost of the damage, in accordance with the halakha in the case of pebbles. Sumakhos says: The owner pays the full cost of the damage. It is taught in another baraita: If chickens were hopping upon dough or upon produce and they sullied it with their feet, or if they pecked at it and caused damage, their owner pays the full cost of the damage. If in the course of their hopping they stirred up dust or propelled pebbles, the owner pays half the cost of the damage. Sumakhos says: He pays the full cost of the damage.

It is taught in another baraita: If a chicken was flying from place to place and wind emerged from beneath its wings and the wind caused vessels to break, the owner pays half the cost of the damage. The Gemara notes: This unattributed baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Sumakhos and hold that the owner pays half the cost of the damage in these cases, just as he does in the case of pebbles propelled by the feet of an animal.

Rava analyzed the baraita and said: Granted, the opinion of Sumakhos is understood, as he holds that the status of damage resulting from a force generated by the animal’s action is like that of damage directly caused by the animal itself, and therefore the owner pays the full cost of the damage in both cases. But the opinion of the Rabbis is difficult, as if they hold that the status of damage resulting from a force generated by the animal’s action is like that of damage directly caused by the animal itself, the owner should be required to pay the full cost of the damage. And if they hold that the status of damage resulting from a force generated by the animal’s action is not like that of damage directly caused by the animal itself, and is not attributed to the animal, then the owner should not be required to pay even half the cost of the damage.

Then Rava said: Actually, the Rabbis hold that the status of damage resulting from a force generated by the animal’s action is like that of damage directly caused by the animal itself, and in principle the owner should be required to pay the full cost of the damage. And the liability to pay for half the cost of the damage caused by pebbles is because the Rabbis learned this halakha through tradition, and it does not correspond to the standard halakhot of damages.

§ Rava says: With regard to any type of action which, when a zav interacts with a vessel in that manner, he renders it ritually impure, if the same type of action was done by an animal, resulting in damage, the owner of the animal is liable to pay the full cost of the damage. Conversely, with regard to any type of action which, when a zav interacts with a vessel in that manner, he leaves it ritually pure, e.g., where the contact is indirect, if the same type of action was done by an animal, resulting in damage, the owner of the animal is liable to pay only half the cost of the damage.

The Gemara asks: And Rava, did he come to teach us the halakha of pebbles? The substance of Rava’s statement is that for damage caused by the indirect action of an animal, its owner pays half the cost of the damage. That is identical to the halakha of pebbles articulated in the baraitot cited earlier. The Gemara answers: No, Rava teaches us the halakha in the case of a calf pulling a cart [karon]. Just as with regard to a zav, the status of a vessel that a zav moves is like that of a vessel with which he came into contact, so too, the status of damage caused by the cart pulled by the animal is like that of damage caused by the animal’s body, and it is not considered indirect damage like in the case of pebbles.

It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rava: An animal is deemed forewarned with regard to breaking objects in the course of its walking. How so? If an animal entered into the courtyard of the injured party, and it damaged an object with its body in the course of its walking; or with its hair in the course of its walking; or with the saddle that is on it; or with the packed saddlebag that is on it; or with the halter that is in its mouth; or with the bell that is around its neck; or if a donkey caused damage with its burden; or if a calf caused damage while pulling a cart; in all these cases the owner pays the full cost of the damage.

§ The Sages taught: In a case where chickens were pecking at the rope tied to a bucket and the rope was severed and the bucket fell and broke, their owner pays the full cost of the damage.

Rava raises a dilemma: If an animal trod upon a vessel but did not break it and the vessel then rolled to another place and broke there, what is the halakha? Rava elaborates: In determining one’s liability for causing damage, do we follow the initial action that ultimately led to the damage and this case is regarded as damage caused by the animal itself? Accordingly, the owner would pay the full cost of the damage as he would in any case classified under the primary category of Trampling. Or perhaps do we follow the breaking of the vessel and therefore this case is regarded as similar to the case of pebbles propelled by the foot of an animal in the course of its walking, since the vessel was not broken by a direct action of the animal, but rather, as an indirect result of the animal’s action?

The Gemara suggests: Resolve Rava’s dilemma from the statement of Rabba, as Rabba says: If one threw a vessel from a roof and another came and broke it with a stick as it was falling, the one who hit it with the stick is exempt from all liability as we say to him that he broke a broken vessel. From the moment the vessel was tossed from the roof it was inevitable that it would break. Consequently, breaking it with a stick as it was falling had no real effect. Apparently, the initial action is the decisive factor in determining liability for damages. The same should be the halakha in a case where a vessel was trod upon by an animal but it did not break, and the vessel then rolled to another place and broke there. The liability should be determined based on the initial action that caused the damage. The Gemara rejects this proof: The halakha in this case is clear to Rabba, who ruled as he did, but it remains a dilemma to Rava. One cannot prove the opinion of one amora from the opinion of another.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear the resolution of this dilemma from a baraita: With regard to hopping, a chicken is not deemed forewarned. And some say that it is forewarned.

The Gemara questions the formulation of the baraita: Does it enter your mind to raise the possibility that a chicken is not forewarned with regard to hopping? Hopping is the typical manner of movement for chickens. Rather, is it not that the reference in the baraita is to a case where the chicken was hopping and the hopping propelled the vessel to roll to another place, and the vessel was broken there? And they disagree with regard to this: One Sage holds that we follow the initial action that ultimately led to the damage, and since hopping is typical manner of movement for a chicken, its owner is responsible for any damage that resulted from its hopping. And one Sage holds: We follow the breaking of the vessel, and since there was an additional factor that broke the vessel, the owner of the chicken is not liable.

The Gemara rejects the parallel between the dispute and the dilemma: No, the dispute in the baraita can be explained differently.