דף 62

In what case is this statement said? It is in a case where one kindled a fire on his premises and the fire spread and burned items in premises belonging to another. But with regard to one who kindles a fire on premises belonging to another that destroys a stack of wheat, all agree that he pays compensation for everything that was inside the stack.

And Rabbi Yehuda concedes to the Rabbis that in a case where one lends space to another in his field to stack grain, and this person stacked grain in the field and concealed items inside the stack, if the owner of the field causes the stack to be burned down, he pays compensation for the stack alone, since the other person did not have permission to conceal items inside his stack. Similarly, if one received permission to stack wheat in the field of another and he stacked barley; or conversely, if he received permission to stack barley and he stacked wheat; or similarly, if he stacked wheat and covered the stack with barley, or stacked barley and covered the stack with wheat, in all these cases, Rabbi Yehuda concedes that he pays compensation for the barley alone, which is less than the value of wheat.

§ Rava says: With regard to one who gives a gold dinar to a woman for safekeeping and says to her: Be careful with this dinar because it is made of silver, if she herself damaged the dinar, she must pay compensation for the value of a gold dinar. This is because he can say to her: What business did you have damaging it? If she was negligent and it was lost or stolen, she pays as compensation only the value of a silver dinar, since she can say to him: I undertook to safeguard only a silver dinar, but I did not undertake to safeguard a gold dinar.

Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: You teach this halakha as a statement of Rava, but for us this halakha is obvious from the baraita that taught: If one stacked wheat and covered the stack with barley, or stacked barley and covered the stack with wheat, the one responsible for the fire pays compensation for the barley alone. Evidently, the one who kindled the fire can say to the owner of the stack: I undertook to safeguard a stack of barley but not a stack of wheat. Here too, in the case of a golden dinar presented as a silver dinar, the woman can say to him: I did not undertake to safeguard a gold dinar.

§ Rav said: I heard a halakhic matter in connection with Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion in the mishna but I do not know what it is. Shmuel said: And does Abba, which was Rav’s name, really not know what he heard? This is the statement that he heard: According to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who deems one liable for concealed articles damaged by a fire, the Sages applied the ordinance of a robbery victim to one whose concealed items are damaged by his fire. Just as the Sages instituted an ordinance that a robbery victim can take an oath as to what was stolen from him and the robber must repay him accordingly, similarly, according to Rabbi Yehuda the owner of the stack can take an oath that certain items were inside the stack, and the one responsible for the fire must pay compensation for them.

Ameimar asks: Did they apply this ordinance of a robbery victim in the case of an informer who causes another person’s property to be confiscated by the gentile authorities, or not? The question is clarified: According to the opinion of the one who says that we do not judge cases of liability for damage caused by indirect action, do not ask the question, as according to that opinion we also do not judge cases of liability for informers who cause indirect damage.

Rather, when you ask this question, it is in accordance with the opinion of the one who said that we judge cases of liability for damage caused by indirect action, and the question is: Did the Sages apply the ordinance of a robbery victim to one whose items were taken due to an informer, meaning that the victim can take an oath to support his claim with regard to what was taken and take this amount in compensation, or not? No conclusion was reached about this, and the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

An incident was related about a certain man who kicked a safe belonging to another, sending it flying into the river. The owner of the safe came to court and said: I had such and such inside it. Rav Ashi sat and was investigating the question: In a case like this, what is the halakha? Does the court believe the claimant or not?

Ravina said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, and some say that Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: Is this not identical to the case of the mishna, as we learned in the mishna: And the Rabbis concede to Rabbi Yehuda that if one sets fire to a building, he pays compensation for everything that was burned inside it, since it is the normal way of people to place items in houses? Similarly, it is the normal way of people to place money in a safe, and the court should rely on the claim of the victim.

Rav Ashi said to him: If the claimant were to claim that there were coins in the safe, this ruling would apply here also. But with what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the claimant claims that there was a pearl [marganita] in the safe. What is the halakha? Do people typically place pearls in a safe, in which case he should be believed, or not? The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: If the one whose home was burned by the fire were to claim that he had, among other items, a silver goblet in the building, what is the halakha? Is he believed or not? Rav Ashi said to him: We view his situation. If he is a wealthy person, who would typically have a silver goblet, or alternatively, if he is a trustworthy person with whom people entrust valuable items, he can take an oath that this is what he had and take compensation according to his claim. But if he is not such a person, it is not in his power to be believed in such a claim.

§ Rav Adda, son of Rav Avya, said to Rav Ashi: Concerning two terms used to describe those who take another’s property against his will, a gazlan and a ḥamsan, what is the difference between them? Rav Ashi said to him: A ḥamsan gives money for the article that he takes from its owner, albeit against the owner’s will, whereas a gazlan does not give money.

Rav Adda was puzzled by this response and said to him: If he gives money, do you still call him a ḥamsan? Since he pays money for it, he acquires it lawfully, despite the fact that its owner did not sell it voluntarily. But doesn’t Rav Huna say: If one was strung up so that another could coerce him to sell a certain item, and he sold it, his sale is a valid sale. This indicates that a sale under duress is considered a valid sale. Rav Ashi answered: This is not difficult. This case, where the sale under duress is legally considered to be a sale, is referring to a case where he eventually says: I want to sell the item, despite having been forced. By contrast, in that case, where the sale is invalid, he did not say: I want to sell the item.