דף 56

With regard to sacrificial animals for which one bears responsibility to replace them, they are subject to the halakhot of exploitation, as this responsibility indicates a certain aspect of ownership. And those for which one does not bear responsibility to replace them, they are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even in the case of one who sells a Torah scroll, an animal, or a pearl, these items are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation, as they have no fixed price. The Rabbis said to him: The early Sages stated that only these items listed above are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: From where are these matters derived? It is as the Sages taught: It is written: “And if you sell to your colleague an item that is sold, or acquire from your colleague’s hand, one shall not exploit his brother” (Leviticus 25:14). This is referring to an item acquired from hand to hand. Land is excluded, as it is not movable. Slaves are excluded, as they are juxtaposed to land in several sources, and therefore their legal status is like that of land in certain respects. Documents are excluded, as it is written: “And if you sell to your colleague an item that is sold,” indicating an item that is itself sold and itself acquired. Documents are excluded, as they are not sold themselves and they are not acquired themselves. They have no intrinsic value, and they exist only for the proof therein.

From here the Sages said: In the case of one who sells his documents that are no longer in use to a perfumer for use in packaging his wares, they are subject to the halakhot of exploitation because he is selling the paper itself. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? In that case, one sold paper, and it is no different from any other movable property. The Gemara answers: This serves to exclude the opinion of Rav Kahana, who says: There is no exploitation for cases involving perutot, as paper is sold for mere perutot. The Sages therefore teach us: There is exploitation for cases involving perutot. Consecrated property is excluded, as the verse states: “One shall not exploit his brother” (Leviticus 25:14), indicating that these halakhot apply only to transactions involving “his brother,” but not to transactions involving consecrated property.

Rabba bar Memel objects to this: Is that to say that anywhere that it is written “his hand,” the reference is to his actual hand, and not merely to his possession, in its metaphorical sense? If that is so, that which is written: “And taken all his land from his hand” (Numbers 21:26), would you also explain here that he was holding all his land in his hand? Rather, clearly, “from his hand” means from his possession. Here too, “from your colleague’s hand” in the case of exploitation means from his possession.

The Gemara asks: Is that to say that anywhere that it is written “his hand” the reference is not to his actual hand? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: “If the theft is found in his hand” (Exodus 22:3): I have derived from here only his hand; from where do I derive that the halakha is the same if the stolen item is found on his roof, in his courtyard, or in his enclosure? The verse states: “If the theft is found [himmatze timmatze]”; the use of the double verb teaches that the halakha applies in any case where the stolen item is in his possession.

The Gemara infers: The halakha applies if the stolen item is found in his possession, and this includes any place in his possession. The reason is that the Merciful One writes: “If the theft is found [himmatze timmatze].” If that were not so, I would say that wherever He writes “his hand,” the reference is to his actual hand. And furthermore, it is taught in a baraita that it is written with regard to a bill of divorce: “And place it in her hand” (Deuteronomy 24:1). I have derived only her hand; from where do I derive that the halakha is the same if he places the bill of divorce on her roof, in her courtyard, or in her enclosure? The verse states: And place, in any case that he places it in her possession. Here too, the Gemara infers: The reason that any place in her possession is included is that the Merciful One writes “and place.” If that were not so, I would say that wherever He writes “his hand,” the reference is to his actual hand.

Rather, the Gemara rejects Rabba bar Memel’s objection and concludes: Every mention of the term “his hand” in the Torah is a reference to his actual hand. And it is different there, in the verse: “And taken all his land from his hand” (Numbers 21:26), where it cannot be said that the reference is to his actual hand. Rather, it means there: In his possession.

§ Rabbi Zeira raises a dilemma with regard to rental: Is it subject to the halakhot of exploitation, or is it not subject to the halakhot of exploitation? The Gemara elaborates: Is it an item that is sold about which the Merciful One speaks, but not a rental; or perhaps there is no difference? Abaye said to him: Is it written: And if you sell an item that is sold forever? What is written is simply: “And if you sell an item that is sold,” and indeed for its day the rental is considered a sale. The legal status of a rental is that of a sale for a limited period. Consequently, it is subject to the halakhot of exploitation.

Rava raises a dilemma: In a case involving wheat kernels, and one sowed them in the ground, what is the halakha? Are they subject to the halakhot of exploitation, or are they not subject to the halakhot of exploitation? The Gemara elaborates: Is their legal status like that of kernels cast into a jug, and they are subject to the halakhot of exploitation, as they remain movable property? Or, perhaps he subordinated them to the ground, and like land they are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation.

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If we say that the hired laborer said: I sowed six kav of grain in the field, and witnesses came and said that he sowed only five kav in it, but doesn’t Rava himself say: With regard to any item that is otherwise subject to the halakhot of exploitation, and it is sold by measure, or by weight, or by number, even if the disparity was less than the measure of exploitation in the transaction, the transaction is reversed. A disparity of one-sixth between the value of an item and its price constitutes exploitation only in cases where there is room for error in assessing the value of an item. In a case where the sale item is easily quantifiable, any deviation from the designated quantity results in a nullification of the transaction, even if the wheat kernels are subordinate to the ground.

Rather, it is a case where the hired laborer said: I cast kernels in the field as required, without quantifying the measure of the kernels that he cast, and it was discovered that he did not cast kernels in the field as required. Are they subject to the halakhot of exploitation or are they not subject to the halakhot of exploitation? Is the legal status of these kernels like that of kernels cast into a jug, and they are subject to the halakhot of exploitation? Or, perhaps the laborer subordinated them to the ground?

Rava raises an additional dilemma: If the laborer admitted to part of the claim, does he take an oath with regard to the kernels or does he not take an oath with regard to the kernels? Is their legal status like that of kernels cast into a jug, and one takes an oath with regard to them? Or, perhaps he subordinated them to the ground, and one does not take an oath with regard to them, as the halakha is that one does not take an oath about a claim involving land.

Rava raises an additional dilemma: Does the sacrifice of the omer offering permit one to eat the produce grown from these kernels, or does the sacrifice of the omer offering not permit one to eat the produce? The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? If it is a case where the kernels took root, we already learned that halakha. If it is a case where the kernels did not yet take root, we already learned that halakha also. As we learned in a mishna (Menaḥot 70a): If crops took root before the sacrifice of the omer offering, the omer offering renders it permitted to eat them. And if not, if they took root only after the sacrifice of the omer offering, it is prohibited to eat them until the time for the sacrifice of the next omer offering will arrive.

No, Rava’s dilemma is not superfluous, as it is necessary to raise it in a case where one reaped grain and sowed its kernels prior to the time of the omer offering, and the time of the omer offering arrived and passed while they were in the ground, and the kernels did not take root before the sacrifice of the omer offering.