דף 58

The opposite is reasonable. An oath concerning sacrificial animals for which one does not bear responsibility is considered to be a matter related to the Lord even more than an oath concerning a sacrificial animal for which one bears responsibility, as in the latter case it is owned by the person in some respects. The tanna said to him: Should I delete this baraita because it is corrupted?

Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Abba said to him: No, this is what the baraita is saying: For an oath taken concerning sacrificial animals for which one bears responsibility, one is liable to bring an offering for a false oath, as it is included due to the phrase “against the Lord, and deals falsely.” It is derived from this that one is liable for taking a false oath even with regard to an item which belongs, to a certain degree, to the Lord. And with regard to sacrificial animals for which one does not bear responsibility, one is exempt, as it is excluded by the phrase: With his neighbor and deals falsely. It is derived from this that one is liable to bring an offering for a false oath only if it pertained to property that belongs to a layman, i.e., his neighbor, but not for an item that belongs completely to God, as is the case with regard to sacrificial animals for which one does not bear responsibility.

§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yehuda says: Even in the case of one who sells a Torah scroll, a pearl, or an animal, those items are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation. It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: Even in the case of one who sells a Torah scroll, it is not subject to the halakhot of exploitation, as there is no limit to its value. It is the Torah of God, which is priceless. An animal and a pearl are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation because a person seeks to pair them. An animal is paired with an animal of similar strength so that they can be yoked together to work in the field. A pearl is paired with a similar pearl to fashion jewelry. Since there is a need to obtain a specific variant of these items, one is not particular about the price.

The baraita continues: The Rabbis said to him: But isn’t it the case that with regard to every item, a person seeks to pair them with similar items under certain circumstances? According to your explanation, the halakhot of exploitation would never apply. The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yehuda respond to that question? He claims that these are significant to a person, but those are not significant to him. In other words, it is particularly important to find a precise match for an animal and a pearl. The Gemara continues to analyze Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion. And up to how much can one deviate from the value of items for which exploitation does not apply, as Rabbi Yehuda is clearly not saying that any deviation is acceptable? Ameimar said: One can deviate up to double their value.

It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: Even in the case one who sells a horse, or a sword, or a helmet [veḥatitom] during wartime, these items are not subject to the halakhot of exploitation, because they then have the capacity to preserve life, and a person is willing to pay any price for them.

MISHNA: Just as there is a prohibition against exploitation [ona’a] in buying and selling, so is there ona’a in statements, i.e., verbal mistreatment. The mishna proceeds to cite examples of verbal mistreatment. One may not say to a seller: For how much are you selling this item, if he does not wish to purchase it. He thereby upsets the seller when the deal fails to materialize. The mishna lists other examples: If one is a penitent, another may not say to him: Remember your earlier deeds. If one is the child of converts, another may not say to him: Remember the deeds of your ancestors, as it is stated: “And a convert shall you neither mistreat, nor shall you oppress him” (Exodus 22:20).

GEMARA: The Sages taught: It is written: “And you shall not mistreat [tonu] one man his colleague; and you shall fear your God, for I am the Lord your God” (Leviticus 25:17). The tanna explains: The verse is speaking with regard to verbal mistreatment. The baraita proceeds: Do you say that it is speaking of verbal mistreatment [be’ona’at devarim], or perhaps it is speaking only with regard to monetary exploitation [be’ona’at mammon]? When it says in a previous verse: “And if you sell to your colleague an item that is sold, or acquire from your colleague’s hand, you shall not exploit [tonu] his brother” (Leviticus 25:14), monetary exploitation is explicitly stated. How then do I realize the meaning of the verse: “And you shall not mistreat one man his colleague”? It is with regard to verbal mistreatment.

How so? If one is a penitent, another may not say to him: Remember your earlier deeds. If one is the child of converts, another may not say to him: Remember the deed of your ancestors. If one is a convert and he came to study Torah, one may not say to him: Does the mouth that ate unslaughtered carcasses and animals that had wounds that would have caused them to die within twelve months [tereifot], and repugnant creatures, and creeping animals, comes to study Torah that was stated from the mouth of the Almighty?

If torments are afflicting a person, if illnesses are afflicting him, or if he is burying his children, one may not speak to him in the manner that the friends of Job spoke to him: “Is not your fear of God your confidence, and your hope the integrity of your ways? Remember, I beseech you, whoever perished, being innocent?” (Job 4:6–7). Certainly you sinned, as otherwise you would not have suffered misfortune.

Likewise, if donkey drivers are asking to purchase grain from someone, and he has none, he may not say to them: Go to so-and-so, as he sells grain, if he knows about him that he never sold grain at all. He thereby causes the donkey drivers and the would-be seller anguish. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may not even cast his eyes on the merchandise for sale, creating the impression that he is interested, at a time when he does not have money to purchase it. Verbal mistreatment is not typically obvious, and it is difficult to ascertain the intent of the offender, as the matter is given to the heart of each individual, as only he knows what his intention was when he spoke. And with regard to any matter given to the heart, it is stated: “And you shall fear your God” (Leviticus 25:17), as God is privy to the intent of the heart.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai: Greater is the transgression of verbal mistreatment than the transgression of monetary exploitation, as with regard to this, verbal mistreatment, it is stated: “And you shall fear your God.” But with regard to that, monetary exploitation, it is not stated: “And you shall fear your God.” And Rabbi Elazar said this explanation: This, verbal mistreatment, affects one’s body; but that, monetary exploitation, affects one’s money. Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani says: This, monetary exploitation, is given to restitution; but that, verbal mistreatment, is not given to restitution.

The Gemara relates that the tanna who recited mishnayot and baraitot in the study hall taught a baraita before Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak: Anyone who humiliates another in public, it is as though he were spilling blood. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said to him: You have spoken well, as we see that after the humiliated person blushes, the red leaves his face and pallor comes in its place, which is tantamount to spilling his blood. Abaye said to Rav Dimi: In the West, i.e., Eretz Yisrael, with regard to what mitzva are they particularly vigilant? Rav Dimi said to him: They are vigilant in refraining from humiliating others, as Rabbi Ḥanina says: Everyone descends to Gehenna except for three.

The Gemara asks: Does it enter your mind that everyone descends to Gehenna? Rather, say: Anyone who descends to Gehenna ultimately ascends, except for three who descend and do not ascend, and these are they: One who engages in intercourse with a married woman, as this transgression is a serious offense against both God and a person; and one who humiliates another in public; and one who calls another a derogatory name. The Gemara asks with regard to one who calls another a derogatory name: That is identical to one who shames him; why are they listed separately? The Gemara answers: Although the victim grew accustomed to being called that name in place of his name, and he is no longer humiliated by being called that name, since the intent was to insult him, the perpetrator’s punishment is severe.

Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: