דף 49

in the time when the Jubilee Year is practiced, and every sale of land is only for its produce, because the land returns to its original owners in the Jubilee Year, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The purchaser brings the first fruits and recites the verses. Reish Lakish says: The purchaser brings the first fruits but he does not recite the verses.

The Gemara explains: Rabbi Yoḥanan says that the purchaser brings the first fruits and recites the verses, because he holds that the acquisition of an item for its produce is considered to be like the acquisition of the item itself. Consequently, the one bringing the fruits can truthfully recite: “The land which You, Lord, have given me” (Deuteronomy 26:10). Reish Lakish says that the purchaser brings the first fruits but he does not recite the verses, because he holds that the acquisition of an item for its produce is not considered to be like the acquisition of the item itself.

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to state the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish in both cases. Because if it was stated only in that case, with regard to one who acquires a field for its produce, one might say that it is only in that case that Reish Lakish says that he does not recite the verses, since already when he descended to the field, i.e., took possession of the land, he descended with the intention of acquiring only the produce, as stipulated at the time of the sale; but in this case, with regard to one who purchases the field when the Jubilee Year is practiced, when he descended to the field with the intention of acquiring the land itself, say that he concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan that he recites the verses. Therefore, it is necessary to state explicitly that Reish Lakish holds that he does not recite the verses in this case as well.

And if it was stated only in this case, with regard to one who purchases the field when the Jubilee Year is practiced, one might say that it is only in this case that Rabbi Yoḥanan says that it is like the acquisition of the item itself and recites the verses, as he purchased the field to fully own it; but in that case, where the sale was only with regard to the produce, say that he concedes to Reish Lakish that he does not recite the verses. Therefore, it is necessary to state the dispute in both cases.

The Gemara offers a proof in support of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion: Come and hear a proof from the mishna (Bikkurim 1:11): One who acquires a tree and its surrounding land brings the first fruits of those trees and recites the verses, even though he is required to return the land in the Jubilee Year. The Gemara responds: With what are we dealing here according to the opinion of Reish Lakish? The mishna is referring to one who acquires a tree and its surrounding land in the time when the Jubilee Year is not practiced, so the acquisition is permanent.

The Gemara suggests another proof in support of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion: Come and hear a proof from the mishna (Bikkurim 1:6): One who acquires two trees in another’s field brings the first fruits of those trees but does not recite the verses, as he acquires only the trees but not the land. But if one acquires three trees, he brings the first fruits of those trees and recites the verses, because he also acquires the land surrounding the trees, despite the fact that the land is returned in the Jubilee Year. The Gemara rejects this: Here too, Reish Lakish would explain that the mishna is referring to one who acquires three trees in the time when the Jubilee Year is not practiced.

The Gemara comments: And now that Rav Ḥisda said: The dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish is with regard to land sold during the second Jubilee, after the Jewish people already practiced the Jubilee Year once and people could trust that the land would be returned in the Jubilee Year, but with regard to land sold during the first Jubilee, which was practiced by the Jews immediately following their entry into Eretz Yisrael, everyone agrees that he brings the first fruits and recites the verses, as they did not yet rely on the fact that the fields would be returned, there is no need to claim that according to Reish Lakish these mishnayot are referring to when the Jubilee Year was not practiced. Instead, one could answer that it is not difficult: This, the mishnayot that state that he brings the first fruits and recites the verses, are referring to land sold during the first Jubilee. That, where Reish Lakish rules that he brings the first fruits but does not recite the verses, is referring to land sold during the second Jubilee.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im. The halakha is that if one consecrated but did not redeem his ancestral field, and the Temple treasury sold it to another Jew, it becomes the property of the priesthood in the Jubilee Year. However, if one purchases a field from another Jew and consecrates it, it reverts back to the original owner in the Jubilee Year. The baraita taught: From where is it derived that one who purchases a field from his father in the time when the Jubilee Year was practiced and consecrated it, and afterward his father died, from where is it derived that it should be considered before him like an ancestral field, and it does not revert to the son’s ownership in the Jubilee Year?

The baraita continues: The verse states: “And if he sanctify to the Lord a field which he has bought, which is not of the field of his ancestral field” (Leviticus 27:22). The addition of the phrase: “Which is not of the field of his ancestral field,” teaches that the halakha that the field reverts to the original owner applies specifically to a field that is not fit to be an ancestral field, meaning that he would not inherit it in the future. This field, which the son was entitled to inherit after he had consecrated it, is excluded, as it is fit to be an ancestral field, although the son had purchased it. This is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon.

The baraita continues: Rabbi Meir says: From where is it derived that one who purchases a field from his father at the time when the Jubilee Year was practiced and his father died, and afterward he consecrated it, from where is it derived that it should be considered before him like an ancestral field, and does not revert to the son in the Jubilee Year? The verse states: “And if he sanctify to the Lord a field which he has bought, which is not of the field of his ancestral field.” The addition of the phrase: “Which is not of the field of his ancestral field,” teaches that the halakha that the field reverts to the original owner applies specifically to a field that is not an ancestral field, meaning that he did not inherit it. This field, which the son inherited before he consecrated it, is excluded, as it is an ancestral field, while according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, a verse is not required to teach that in a case where his father died, and he consecrated it afterward, it is considered an ancestral field, as this is obvious. The Gemara explains why the other tanna’im do not require a verse to teach the halakha in the case discussed by Rabbi Meir:

The Gemara clarifies: What, is it not that they disagree about this, as Rabbi Meir holds: The acquisition of an item for its produce is considered to be like the acquisition of the item itself, and in this case, when he purchased the field, i.e., the rights to the produce, from his father before his death, it is the case that he inherits nothing when his father dies, as he had already taken ownership of the field when he purchased it from his father, and nothing changed with his father’s death; and therefore, if his father died and he consecrated it afterward, then a verse is necessary to teach that it is treated like an ancestral field, as one might have thought that the field is his entirely as a result of the purchase, and not because of an ancestral inheritance.

While Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon hold that the acquisition of an item for its produce is not considered to be like the acquisition of the item itself, and in this case, when he had purchased the field from his father before his father died, with the death of his father he now inherits the field as well, since until now he owned only the rights to the produce; and therefore if his father died and he consecrated the field afterward, a verse is not necessary to teach that it is an ancestral field, as it is obvious that he now owns it due to his inheritance. And when a verse was necessary, it is for a case where he consecrated the field and his father died afterward that it was necessary.

The Gemara rejects this explanation of the dispute. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Actually, I could say to you that in general Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon hold that the acquisition of an item for its produce is considered to be like the acquisition of the item itself, and they agree that the verse is necessary to teach the halakha concerning a case where he consecrated the field after his father’s death. And here, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon found another element of the verse and they expounded it. They maintain that if the verse is teaching the halakha only in the case where he consecrated the field after his father’s death, then let the Merciful One write in the Torah: And if he sanctify to the Lord a field which he has bought, which is not his ancestral field. What is the meaning of the expression: “Of his ancestral field” (Leviticus 27:22)? This emphasizes: A field that is not fit to be an ancestral field, meaning that he would not inherit it in the future. This field, which the son was entitled to inherit after he had consecrated it, is excluded, as it is fit to be an ancestral field, although the son had purchased it.

Rav Yosef said: If not for the fact that Rabbi Yoḥanan said that the acquisition of an item for its produce is considered to be like the acquisition of the item itself, he would not find his hands or his feet in the study hall, i.e., there would be a contradiction between Rabbi Yoḥanan’s statements. As Rav Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Brothers who divided property received as an inheritance are considered to be purchasers from one another, and as purchasers of land they must return the portions to each other in the Jubilee Year, at which point they may redistribute the property.

And if it enters your mind to say that the legal status of the acquisition of an item for its produce is not like that of the acquisition of the item itself, then according to Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion you will find that one brings first fruits by Torah law only when he is an only child the son of an only child, and so forth, dating back to the time of Joshua, son of Nun. Only in such a case does the child fully inherit the land. In any other case, the children inherit only the rights to the produce, as they must return the actual land to each other in the Jubilee Year, and would not be able to recite the verses connected with the first fruits, since they could not refer to the land that the Lord has given them. Since Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that the acquisition of an item for its produce is considered to be like the acquisition of the item itself, anyone who inherits land may recite the verses.

Rava said: A verse and a baraita support the opinion of Reish Lakish. A verse, as it is written: