דף 90

to one of the sons of so-and-so, who had both adult and minor sons. The son to whom she was betrothed was not specified. Rava said: Even according to the one who says that we do not suppress a rumor, in this case we suppress the rumor. People will not slander her. Rather, they will say that the Sages investigated the betrothal and concluded that it was the betrothal of a minor.

A rumor circulated that a certain woman was betrothed to a minor boy who looked like an adult, as his body was developed like an adult. Rav Mordekhai said to Rav Ashi: There was a precedent in which the Sages said that there is no concern that people will think that the woman is betrothed, since the boy did not yet reach the divisions of Reuben, i.e., the competence of adulthood, as it is stated: “Among the divisions of Reuben there were major resolves of heart” (Judges 5:16). Therefore, the betrothal is rendered entirely invalid, and there is no concern of slander.

§ It is stated in the mishna that a rumor is treated seriously only provided there is no explanation. Rabba bar Rav Huna said: The explanation mentioned in the mishna negates the rumor even if it circulates at some point from now, i.e., from the time the rumor circulated, until ten days afterward. Rav Zevid says: Where there is the reasonable possibility of an explanation, we are concerned about the possibility of an explanation even if it is not mentioned explicitly, and the rumor is therefore disregarded.

Rav Pappa raised an objection to the opinion of Rav Zevid from the expression in the mishna: Provided there is no explanation, which indicates that the explanation must be mentioned for it to be regarded. Rav Zevid said to him: The mishna is saying that where there is the reasonable possibility of an explanation the rumor is disregarded, even if it was not mentioned.

Rav Kahana said to Rav Pappa: And you, do you not hold Rav Zevid’s statement to be true? But didn’t we learn in a mishna that if a woman was betrothed after her husband was taken for dead, and then her husband came back, she is permitted to return to him (Yevamot 92a), which would not have been the case if she had been married and not merely betrothed? Isn’t this because we say that the second man betrothed her conditionally, stipulating that if her husband is found to be alive the betrothal is null, even though this explanation did not circulate explicitly?

The Gemara answers: It is different there because the husband comes and contests the betrothal, which shows clearly that he never divorced her and that her betrothal was mistaken. Therefore, there is no need for an additional explanation.

The Gemara asks: If so, in a case where she married the second man, it should also be permitted for her to return to her first husband. Why do the Sages render it prohibited for her to do so? The Gemara answers: In a case where she married him, since she performed a prohibited action, albeit unintentionally, by engaging in sexual intercourse with a man who is not her husband while she was married, the Sages penalized her. By contrast, in a case where she was merely betrothed, since she did not perform a prohibited action, the Sages did not penalize her.

§ Rav Ashi said: Any rumor that was not confirmed in court is not regarded as a significant rumor. And Rav Ashi said: With regard to any rumor that was spread about a woman after her marriage, we are not concerned about it. She need not leave her husband, and he need not divorce her. The Gemara infers that if the rumor circulated after her betrothal we are concerned about it, and she must be divorced from her betrothed. Rav Ḥaviva said: Even if it circulated after her betrothal, we are still not concerned about it. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that we are not concerned about it.

Rav Yirmeya bar Abba said that a group of students from the study hall of Rav sent the following question to Shmuel after Rav’s death: Teach us, our master: If a rumor circulated about a woman that she is betrothed to a first man, and another man came and betrothed her in a manner of betrothal that is recognized by Torah law, as there is clear testimony of it, what is the halakha? He sent them an answer: She must leave the second man, and you clarify the matter to figure out exactly what happened and inform me.

The Gemara asks: What is meant by: And you clarify the matter? If we say that he said this so that if it is discovered that the betrothal of the first man was not a proper betrothal we should suppress the rumor, thereby permitting her to marry the second man, isn’t Neharde’a Shmuel’s locale? And as mentioned above, in Neharde’a they would not suppress a rumor. Rather, he must have instructed them in this manner because if it is discovered that the betrothal of the first man was a proper betrothal, she does not need a bill of divorce from the second man.

And in ruling that she does not need a bill of divorce from the second man, Shmuel is in disagreement with Rav Huna, as Rav Huna says: In the case of a married woman who extended her hand and received money or a document of betrothal from another man, it is considered uncertain whether or not the woman is betrothed to him, and she needs a bill of divorce from him.

Rav Huna’s opinion is based on a principle stated by Rav Hamnuna, as Rav Hamnuna says that a woman who said to her husband: You divorced me, is deemed credible, due to the presumption that a wife is not so brazen to lie in this manner before her husband. Therefore, in the case brought before Shmuel, the fact that the woman received money or a document of betrothal from the second man should be considered sufficient basis for the rumor to be suppressed, since if she were already betrothed she certainly would not have accepted the betrothal from him.

The Gemara asks: And how does the other Sage, Shmuel, who disagrees with Rav Huna, relate to this principle? The Gemara answers: He holds that Rav Hamnuna’s principle was stated in reference to a case when the wife says in her husband’s presence that he divorced her, but when she is not in his presence she is certainly brazen enough to lie in this manner. Therefore, in the case brought before Shmuel, the woman may have accepted the betrothal of the other man because it was not in her husband’s presence.

The Gemara asks: What is the halakha if they did not find a clear matter, i.e., they could not establish with certainty whether she was betrothed to the first man?

Rav Huna says: The first man divorces her and the second man marries her. But for the second man to divorce her and the first man to marry her is not permitted. The Gemara explains: What is the reason that it is not permitted? It is prohibited lest people come to say that the first man is remarrying his divorcée after her betrothal to another man, as they will mistakenly assume that the first man betrothed her and then divorced her, thereby enabling her to be betrothed to the second man. Therefore, if he marries her after she is divorced from the second man, people will conclude that he is in violation of the Torah prohibition of remarrying one’s divorcée after she was married to another man.

Rav Shinnana, son of Rav Idi, says: For the second man to divorce her and the first man to marry her is also permitted. There is no concern that people will assume that the first man is remarrying his divorcée, as they will say that the Sages investigated the second man’s betrothal and found that it was a mistaken betrothal.

The Gemara asks: What is the halakha if a rumor circulated about her having been betrothed to this man and then another rumor was spread that she became betrothed to that man? Rav Pappa says: In this case too, the first man divorces her and the second man marries her, due to the previously mentioned concern that people will think that he is remarrying his divorcée after she was betrothed to another man. Ameimar says: She is permitted to both the first and the second man. One of them must divorce her while the other may marry her.