דף 29

in order to differentiate between the valuation of a man and the valuation of a woman. Therefore, it could not have been derived from that verse that a tumtum and a hermaphrodite are excluded from the halakha of valuations, were it not for the superfluous words “the” and “if.”

§ The mishna teaches that if the fetus emerged in pieces, or if it emerged reversed, i.e., feetfirst rather than headfirst; when most of its limbs emerge, its status is like that of a child born, with regard to the impurity of a woman after childbirth. Rabbi Elazar says: Even if the head is among the limbs that emerged, provided that the majority of the limbs did not yet emerge, the fetus is not considered born.

And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: They taught in the mishna that the woman is not impure unless most of the fetus’s limbs emerged only in a case where the head is not among the limbs that emerged; but if the head is among them, the head exempts the woman’s future offspring from the obligation of primogeniture, as the fetus is considered born.

The Gemara asks: Shall we say that these Sages disagree with regard to the opinion of Shmuel? As Shmuel said that if a woman is pregnant with twins, and the head of one of the fetuses emerges and then disappears back into the womb, this does not exempt the other fetus from the obligation of primogeniture should it be born first. Shmuel says this specifically in a case of non-viable newborns, i.e., where the fetus whose head emerged was a non-viable newborn and the one that was eventually born first is a viable offspring. But if both are viable offspring, the emergence of the head is considered birth. The suggestion is that Rabbi Elazar agrees with the opinion of Shmuel, whereas Rabbi Yoḥanan disagrees with the opinion of Shmuel and maintains that the emergence of the head is considered birth even in the case of a non-viable newborn.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion, as it is possible that in the case of a whole non-viable newborn, everyone, i.e., Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yoḥanan, agrees that the emergence of the head is considered a birth, contrary to the opinion of Shmuel. When they disagree, it is in the case of a fetus that emerged in pieces. As one Sage, Rabbi Elazar, holds that it is specifically in the case of a whole non-viable newborn that the emergence of the head is considered birth, whereas with regard to a fetus that emerged in pieces it is not considered birth; and one Sage, Rabbi Yoḥanan, holds that in the case of a fetus that emerged in pieces as well, the emergence of the head is considered birth.

The Gemara cites another version of this discussion. The reason it is necessary for most of the limbs of the fetus to emerge for it to be considered born is that it emerged in pieces, or that it emerged reversed, i.e., feet first. It may be inferred from here that if it emerged in its proper manner, headfirst and whole, it is considered born, even according to Rabbi Elazar. Therefore, if the woman is pregnant with twins, the emergence of the head exempts the other twin from the obligations of primogeniture. Evidently, both Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Elazar do not hold in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, as Shmuel said that the emergence of the head of one of the twins does not exempt the other in a case of non-viable newborns.

There are those who teach this halakha by itself, i.e., not in reference to the mishna: Rabbi Elazar says: The emergence of the head of a non-viable newborn is not considered like the emergence of most of the limbs; and Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The emergence of the head of a non-viable newborn is considered like the emergence of most of the limbs. And they disagree with regard to the opinion of Shmuel; Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with Shmuel’s opinion, whereas Rabbi Yoḥanan does not accept the opinion of Shmuel.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: We learned in the mishna that if the fetus emerged in pieces or if it emerged reversed, when most of its limbs emerge, its status is like that of a child born. The Gemara infers: From the fact that the mishna states: Or reversed, by inference in the case of a fetus that emerged in pieces it emerged in its proper manner, i.e., the head first and then the body, and nevertheless the mishna states that it is only when most of its limbs emerge that its status is like that of a child born. This is difficult for the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, as he maintains that once the head emerges, the fetus is considered born.

The Gemara explains that Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you: Say that the mishna is referring to a case where the fetus emerged in pieces and reversed, whereas if it emerged with its head first, it is considered born even if most of its limbs did not emerge yet.

The Gemara asks: But doesn’t the mishna teach that the fetus emerged in pieces or reversed? If so, it cannot be explained as referring to a case where the fetus emerged both in pieces and reversed. The Gemara answers that this is what the mishna is saying: If the fetus emerged in pieces or whole, and in both this case and that case it emerged reversed, then when most of its limbs emerge, its status is like that of a child born.

Rav Pappa says: This dispute between Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yoḥanan is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as it is stated in a baraita: If the fetus emerged in pieces or reversed, when most of its limbs emerge its status is like that of a child born. Rabbi Yosei says: Its status is like that of a child born when it emerges in its proper manner. The Gemara asks: What is Rabbi Yosei saying? His statement apparently indicates that if a fetus emerges with its feet first, then even after most of its limbs emerge it is not considered born.

Rav Pappa says that this is what the baraita is saying: If the fetus emerged in pieces or reversed, when most of its limbs emerge its status is like that of a child born; but by inference, if the fetus emerged in its proper manner, then the emergence of the head exempts its twin, should it eventually be born first, from the obligations of primogeniture. And Rabbi Yosei says: The status of a fetus that emerged in pieces is like that of a child born when most of its limbs emerge, provided that it emerged in its proper manner, i.e., both requirements are necessary. The suggestion is that the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan is in accordance with the ruling of the first tanna, that even if a fetus emerges in pieces, once its head emerges it is considered born; whereas the opinion of Rabbi Elazar follows the ruling of Rabbi Yosei that even if such a fetus emerges headfirst, it is not considered born.

Rav Zevid objects to Rav Pappa’s interpretation of the baraita: Since Rabbi Yosei issued his statement that both requirements are necessary, i.e., a majority of limbs and emergence in the proper manner, with regard to the two cases mentioned by the first tanna, by inference in the other case, where the fetus emerged reversed, even when most of its limbs emerge it does not exempt its twin from the obligations of primogeniture. But this is difficult, as we maintain that the majority of an item is considered like all of it. Accordingly, when most of the fetus’s limbs emerge it should be considered born even if it came out feetfirst.

Rather, Rav Zevid says that this is what the baraita is saying: If the fetus emerged in pieces and reversed, when most of its limbs emerge its status is like that of a child born; but by inference, if the fetus emerged in its proper manner then the emergence of the head exempts its twin from the obligations of primogeniture, even if it was born in pieces. Rabbi Yosei says: The fetus is considered born once its head emerges only in a case when it emerges in its proper manner alive; if it emerges in pieces, the fetus is considered born only when most of its limbs emerge.

This explanation is also taught explicitly in another baraita: If the fetus emerged in pieces and reversed, then when most of its limbs emerge its status is like that of a child born; but if the fetus emerged in its proper manner, the emergence of the head exempts its twin. Rabbi Yosei says: The fetus is considered born once its head emerges only in a case where it emerges in its proper manner alive.

And what is the exact stage when a fetus that emerged in its proper manner alive is considered born? When most of its head emerges. And what is the stage when most of its head emerges? Rabbi Yosei says: When its temples emerge. Abba Ḥanan says in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua: When its forehead emerges. And some say: When the corners of its head, i.e., the projection of the head above the neck, are visible.

MISHNA: In the case of a woman who discharges and it is not known what is the fetus’s sex, she shall observe the strictures of a woman who gave birth both to a male and to a female. She is impure for fourteen days, like a woman who gave birth to a female, and any blood the woman sees only until forty days after birth, not eighty days thereafter, is pure, like a woman who gave birth to a male. If it is unknown whether it was a male or female offspring or whether it was not an offspring at all, she shall observe the period of impurity for a woman who gave birth to a male and for a woman who gave birth to a female; and for any blood that she sees, she observes the halakhot of a menstruating woman. Since it is possible that what she discharged was not an offspring at all, any blood she sees might be due to menstruation, not childbirth.

GEMARA: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says: With regard to a pregnant woman who passed across a river and she discharged her fetus into the river, and she does not know whether the fetus was fully formed, she brings the offering of a woman after childbirth, which is a burnt offering and a sin offering. And the sin offering, which is a bird, is eaten after the nape of its neck has been pinched, in the manner of a regular bird sin offering. This is the halakha despite the uncertainty that this fetus might not have been fully formed, in which case the woman would not be obligated to bring this offering, and a bird that is not an offering may not be eaten if its nape was pinched. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi explains the reasoning behind this ruling: One must follow the majority of pregnant women, and most pregnant women give birth to full-fledged offspring.

The Gemara analyzes this claim. We learned in the mishna: If it is unknown whether what the woman discharged was a male or female offspring or whether it was not an offspring at all, she shall observe the period of impurity for a woman who gave birth to a male and for a woman who gave birth to a female; and for any blood that she sees, she observes the halakhot of a menstruating woman. The Gemara asks: According to the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, why must the woman observe the halakhot of a menstruating woman? Let us say that one must follow the majority of women, and the majority of women give birth to full-fledged offspring. If so, she should observe a period of purity, during which any blood she sees is pure, after her period of impurity, like all women after childbirth.

The Gemara answers: The halakha in the mishna is referring to a case where the woman had not been presumed to be pregnant prior to her miscarriage; and when Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi says that a woman who discharges is presumed to have discharged an offspring, he was speaking of a case where the woman had been presumed to be pregnant prior to her miscarriage.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a difficulty with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi from a baraita: There is the case of a kosher animal that had not yet given birth, which went to the pasture full, i.e., pregnant, and came back the same day empty, i.e., with no live offspring.It clearly discharged, but it is unknown whether or not it discharged an offspring, which would exempt the animal’s subsequent offspring from the status of a firstborn. In this case, the offspring that comes after it is a firstborn of uncertain status.

The Gemara asks: But why is this the halakha? According to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, one should follow the reality among the majority of animals, and the majority of animals give birth to full-fledged offspring. And if so, this subsequent offspring of the animal is a regular offspring, i.e., it is definitely not a firstborn.

Ravina says in response: In this case, the halakha does not follow the majority of animals, because it can be said that the majority of animals give birth to an item that exempts the animal’s subsequent offspring from firstborn status, but a minority of animals give birth to an item that does not exempt the animal’s subsequent offspring from firstborn status, i.e., an item that is not a full-fledged offspring. And an additional factor is that all animals that give birth to full-fledged offspring discharge turbid liquids one day before giving birth, and since this animal did not discharge turbid liquids before going to the pasture, the effect of the majority is undermined. Consequently, the status of the animal’s birth is uncertain, and for this reason its subsequent offspring is considered a firstborn of uncertain status.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: If all animals that give birth to full-fledged offspring discharge turbid liquids before giving birth, then it should be concluded from the fact that this animal did not discharge turbid liquids that it did not discharge a full-fledged offspring, and therefore the animal’s subsequent offspring is a proper firstborn, not a firstborn of uncertain status. Rather, one should say that Ravina meant the following: The majority of animals that give birth discharge turbid liquids beforehand, and therefore, since this animal did not discharge turbid liquids, the effect of the majority is undermined.

§ When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said: Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, raises an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi from the halakha of a forgetful woman; but I do not know what the objection is. The Gemara asks: This halakha of a forgetful woman, which forms the basis of the objection, what is it? The Gemara explains: As it is taught in a baraita: