דף 118

MISHNA: In relation to the dispute between Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva in the previous mishna, in which Rabbi Akiva states that one must avoid a possible transgression, the mishna cites two similar cases involving other topics. With regard to one who betrothed one of five women, and he does not know which of them he betrothed, and each one of them says: He betrothed me, if he does not want to marry any of them he gives a bill of divorce to each and every one of them so none will have the status of a woman with regard to whom there is uncertainty whether she is divorced. And he leaves the marriage contract among them and departs. The marriage contract remains in dispute between the women until they clarify which of them is entitled to the money. This is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon.

Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare someone from transgression, as perhaps the woman he actually betrothed will not receive the money to which she is entitled. There is no remedy unless he gives a bill of divorce and a marriage contract payment to each and every one. And likewise, in the case of one who stole money from one of five people and does not know from which of them he stole, and each one says: He stole from me, he leaves the stolen money among them and departs, and they will decide among themselves how to distribute the money; this is the statement of Rabbi Tarfon. Rabbi Akiva says: This is not the way to spare him from transgression; there is no remedy unless he pays each and every one of them.

GEMARA: The Gemara infers: It is taught in the mishna that he betrothed one of five women, whereas it is not taught that he had sexual intercourse with one of five women, as a different ruling applies in this case. Similarly, with regard to the second case, it is taught that he stole from one of five people, and it is not taught that he purchased an item from one of five people. If so, whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is not in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna and it is also not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar.

The Gemara elaborates. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva did not dispute the case of a man who betrothed one of five women and he does not know which of them he betrothed, as everyone agrees in this case that he leaves the money of the marriage contract among them and departs. With regard to what did they disagree? With regard to the case of one who had sexual intercourse with one of them for the purpose of betrothal. Rabbi Tarfon says: He leaves the money among them and departs, while Rabbi Akiva says: He does not fulfill his obligation unless he pays each and every one of them. Since he married in an inappropriate manner, the Sages penalized him by compelling him to pay all the women.

Likewise, Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva did not dispute the case of one who purchased an item from one of five people and he does not know from which of them he purchased it. Everyone agrees in this case that he leaves the price of the purchase among them and departs. They disagree only with regard to one who stole from five people, as Rabbi Tarfon says: He leaves the stolen money among them and departs, and Rabbi Akiva says: He does not fulfill his obligation unless he pays the stolen money to each and every one of them. In this case, as he committed a transgression, he must ensure that the stolen money is restored to its proper owner.

The Gemara states: From the fact that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar said that Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva do not disagree with regard to the cases of one who betrothed and one who purchased, one may learn by inference that the first tanna, with whom he disagrees, holds that they do disagree about the cases of betrothed and purchased, whereas with regard to one who had sexual intercourse and one who stole an item Rabbi Tarfon agrees with Rabbi Akiva. With this in mind, who is the author of the mishna?

The Gemara elaborates: If the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna, let it teach the cases of betrothed and also purchased, but not that of one who stole or one who had intercourse, as the first tanna maintains that Rabbi Tarfon agrees with Rabbi Akiva in those cases. If it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, let it teach the cases of one who had sexual relations and that of one who stole. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds that Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva disagree in the case of one who had sexual relations, not in the case of a man who betrothed one of five women. Likewise, he maintains that they disagree in the case of one who stole from five people, not one who purchased an item from five people.

The Gemara answers: Actually, the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, and what is the meaning of the term: Betrothed? It means that he betrothed one of the women by means of sexual intercourse. And the mishna taught the term betrothed to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the stringent opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

The Gemara explains: As, although this man performed an act that violated a prohibition that applies by rabbinic law, i.e., he did not have licentious sexual relations with her but rather engaged in intercourse for the purpose of betrothal, which is in violation of a rabbinic prohibition that one may not betroth a woman by sexual intercourse ab initio, even so Rabbi Akiva penalizes him. And the mishna taught the case of one who stole so as to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the lenient opinion of Rabbi Tarfon, as although he performed an act that violated a prohibition that applies by Torah law, nevertheless he does not penalize him even in this case.

MISHNA: In the case of a woman who went, she and her husband, overseas, and her son was with them, and later she came back and said: My husband died and afterward my son died, she is deemed credible. It is permitted for her to remarry, and she is exempt from levirate marriage. The reason is that she had children when she left, and therefore she retains her presumptive status of one who is exempt from levirate marriage. However, if she said: My son died and afterward my husband died, she is not deemed credible, i.e., she may not enter into levirate marriage. And yet we are concerned and give some credence to her statement, in case she was actually widowed by a childless husband, and therefore she performs ḥalitza to exempt her from the levirate bond with her yavam, and she does not enter into levirate marriage.

If she went with her childless husband and returned alone and testified: A son was born to me overseas, and she further said: My son died and afterward my husband died, she is deemed credible and may even enter into levirate marriage, as she was presumed to be childless when she left and consequently she retains that presumptive status. However, if she said: My husband died and afterward my son died, she is not deemed credible for the purpose of exempting her from levirate marriage, but the court is concerned about her statement. And therefore she must perform ḥalitza and she does not enter into levirate marriage.

If she said: A yavam was born for me overseas, i.e., when the family left the country her husband did not have a brother, and she claims that in the meantime a brother was born to her husband, and she also said: My husband died and afterward my yavam died, or: My yavam died and afterward my husband died, in either case she is deemed credible. This is because when she left she was not presumed to require levirate marriage, and the suggestion that her husband now has a brother is based solely on her testimony.

However, if she went, she and her husband and her yavam, overseas, and upon her return she said: My husband died and afterward my yavam died, or: My yavam died and afterward my husband died, she is not deemed credible, as a woman is not deemed credible if she says: My yavam died, in order that she may marry another man. And she is not deemed credible if she says that her sister died, in order that she may enter the house of her sister’s husband. And a man is not deemed credible if he says: My brother died, so that he may enter into levirate marriage with his brother’s wife, and he is not deemed credible when he says that his wife died, in order that he may marry his wife’s sister. The Sages accepted impaired testimony of this kind only when there was a concern about creating a situation of a deserted wife.

GEMARA: Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: In the case of a man who confers possession of a bill of divorce to his wife, i.e., he appoints an agent to take the bill of divorce to his wife, when she has a potential yavam, what is the halakha if her husband dies before she is divorced? One might say that since she hates her yavam, receiving the bill of divorce is for her benefit, as this act renders her prohibited to him, and it is a principle that one may act in a person’s interest in his absence. If so, as soon as the husband gives the bill of divorce to the agent she is divorced. Or perhaps, since she sometimes loves her yavam, this bill of divorce is to her disadvantage, and one may not act against a person’s interest in his absence. Consequently, she is not divorced until the bill of divorce reaches her possession.

Rav Naḥman said to Rava that we learned an answer to this dilemma in the mishna: And we are concerned about her statement, and she must perform ḥalitza and she does not enter into levirate marriage. The mishna states that the court gives her statement some credence in either case, both when her testimony would exempt her from levirate marriage and when it would allow her to marry her yavam. This indicates that levirate marriage is considered neither in her interest nor a disadvantage for her. Rather, its classification is uncertain.

§ Ravina said to Rava: With regard to one who confers possession of a bill of divorce to his wife through an agent in a situation when there was a quarrel between them, what is the halakha? The Gemara explains both sides of the question: Since she has a quarrel with him, the bill of divorce might be considered for her benefit. Or perhaps, her physical comfort is preferable to her, as she prefers to remain married despite the quarrel between her and her husband. Come and hear a resolution, as Reish Lakish said: There is a popular idiom among women: It is better to sit as two [tan du] than to sit lonely as a widow, i.e., a woman prefers the companionship of any husband over being alone.

Abaye said a similar popular expression: One whose husband is small as an ant, she places her seat among the noblewomen, as she considers herself important merely by virtue of being married. Rav Pappa said a different maxim: One whose husband is a wool comber [naftza], a lowly occupation, she calls him to sit with her at the entrance to the house, to display herself as a married woman.

Similarly, Rav Ashi says: One whose husband sells cabbage heads [kulsa] does not require lentils for her pot. She is so happy she is married that she does not mind even if he does not provide her with food. The Gemara comments: A Sage taught: And all of these women who appear so satisfied with their marriage, they all commit adultery and attribute the children to their husbands. This is another reason why they are so keen to be married. This shows that even when there are quarrels between a couple, the wife still prefers the status of a married woman, and therefore the bill of divorce is not considered in her interest.

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