דף 84

Come and hear a proof for the matter, as Rabba bar Shmuel taught in the following baraita: With regard to a pregnant woman who smells and craves food, one feeds her until she is satisfied, even on Yom Kippur; and in the case of one whom a mad dog bit, one feeds him from the lobe of its liver; and in the case of one who has pain in his mouth, one places medicine in his mouth on Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, who said it in the name of Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash. And the Rabbis say: In this case and no other. The Gemara clarifies: To which case is this one referring? If we say they said this about a pregnant woman, it is obvious; is there anyone who says one should not give a pregnant woman food? Rather, is it not referring to the halakha pertaining to medicine on Shabbat, which they agree is permitted? Learn from this that the Rabbis did not disagree about this.

Rav Ashi said: The wording of the mishna is also precise in accordance with this approach, as it was taught in the mishna: And furthermore, Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash said: In the case of one who suffers pain in his mouth, one places medicine in his mouth on Shabbat, and the Rabbis do not disagree with him and say otherwise. And if it is so that the Rabbis disagree with him, then let the mishna combine the two halakhot and teach them together, and let the Rabbis disagree with both points in the latter clause. Since the mishna was not written this way, but instead the dispute of the Rabbis appears after Rabbi Matya’s statement about the mad dog, learn from here that the Rabbis did not disagree with him about the halakha with regard to medicine.

§ The mishna states that one with pain in his throat should be given medicine on Shabbat because it is a case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation. The Gemara asks: Why do I need to say furthermore: And any case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation overrides Shabbat? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: They stated this not only in a case where there is uncertainty with regard to this Shabbat, but even if the uncertainty is with regard to a different future Shabbat.

What are the circumstances in which uncertainty would arise as to whether or not his life will be in danger in the future? They are a case where doctors assess that an ill person needs a certain treatment for eight days, and the first day of his illness is Shabbat. Lest you say: He should wait until evening and begin his treatment after Shabbat so they will not need to desecrate two Shabbatot for his sake, therefore it teaches us that one must immediately desecrate Shabbat for his sake. This is the halakha, despite the fact that an additional Shabbat will be desecrated as a result, because there is uncertainty about whether his life is in danger.

That was also taught in a baraita: One heats water for an ill person on Shabbat, whether to give him to drink or to wash him, since it might help him recover. And they did not say it is permitted to desecrate only the current Shabbat for him, but even a different, future Shabbat. And one must not say: Let us wait and perform this labor for him after Shabbat, perhaps he will get well in the meantime. Rather, one heats it for him immediately because any case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation overrides Shabbat. And this is so not only with regard to uncertainty whether his life is in danger on the current Shabbat, but even in a case of uncertainty with regard to danger on a different Shabbat.

And these acts should not be performed by gentiles or Samaritans but should be done by the greatest of the Jewish people, i.e., their scholars, who know how to act properly. And one does not say: These actions may be performed based on the advice of women or Samaritans, since they are not considered experts able to declare a person ill enough to override Shabbat. However, the opinions of these people do combine with an additional opinion, meaning that if there is a dispute, their opinions may be considered when coming to a decision.

§ The Sages taught in a baraita: One engages in saving a life on Shabbat, and one who is vigilant to do so is praiseworthy. And one need not take permission from a court but hurries to act on his own. How so? If one sees a child who fell into the sea, he spreads a fisherman’s net and raises him from the water. And one who is vigilant and acts quickly is praiseworthy, and one need not seek permission from a court, although in doing so he catches fish in the net as well. Similarly, if one sees a child fall into a pit and the child cannot get out, he digs part of the ground out around the edge of the pit to create a makeshift step and raises him out. And one who is vigilant and acts quickly is praiseworthy, and one need not seek permission from a court, although in doing so he fashions a step.

Similarly, if one sees that a door is locked before a child and the child is scared and crying, he breaks the door and takes the child out. And one who is vigilant and acts quickly is praiseworthy, and one need not seek permission from a court, although he intends to break it into boards to be used later. Similarly, one may extinguish a fire by placing a barrier of metal or clay vessels filled with water in front of it on Shabbat when life is endangered. And one who is vigilant and acts quickly is praiseworthy, and one need not seek permission from a court, although he leaves the coals, which can be used for cooking after Shabbat.

The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to teach these examples, since each one suggests an original idea. As, had it taught us the halakha of the child who fell into the sea, we would have said: He must act quickly in that case because in the meantime, if he delays, the child will be swept away by the waves and disappear, and therefore the rescuer need not seek permission; but in the case of a child who fell into a pit, who remains there and is in no further danger, one might say the rescuer need not hurry but should request permission from the court first. Therefore, the baraita explains: No, it is necessary to tell us that case, too.

And if it had taught us the case of the pit, one might have thought it is because the child is scared at being trapped; but when a door is locked before a child, it is possible to sit on the other side of the door and amuse him with the sound of nuts until Shabbat is over. Therefore, it is necessary to teach that in this case, too, one does not delay but acts immediately because a life is possibly in danger.

It was taught in a baraita that one may extinguish a fire by placing a barrier in front of it on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: Why do I need this? What new point is taught by this additional case of a life-endangering situation? The Gemara answers: This halakha applies even if the fire is spreading toward another courtyard. Not only may this be done to save the lives of people in the courtyard on fire; it may also be done to prevent the fire from spreading to an adjacent courtyard.

§ Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: With regard to saving a life, the Sages did not follow the majority as they do in other areas of halakha. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? When does one not follow the majority? If we say that one does not follow the majority in a case where there are nine Jews and one gentile among them and a building collapses on one of them, then in that case the majority of people are Jews and yet one desecrates Shabbat to save the trapped person. In such a case one is in fact following the majority. Alternatively, if the group is half Jews and half gentiles, the ruling is lenient with regard to a case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation. But this, too, is not a case where one follows the minority, as there is an even chance that the victim is a Jew.

Rather, it is referring to a case where there are nine gentiles and one Jew. However, this too is obvious. One saves the trapped individual because the group is in a fixed location, and there is a principle that whenever a group is in a fixed location it is considered as though it were evenly divided. In this case, despite the fact that the group’s majority is gentile, it is considered as though it were composed half of Jews and half of gentiles.

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach that one does not follow the majority in a case where one individual did not remain with the group in their courtyard but separated and went to another courtyard, and a building collapses on him. Lest you say: One should follow the principle that whatever is separated from a group is considered to have left from the majority, and since there was a majority of gentiles there the individual who left the group was probably a gentile, and it is not necessary to clear the debris for a gentile on Shabbat, therefore it teaches us that with regard to uncertainty in a situation of saving a life, one does not follow the majority.

The Gemara asks: Is that so? But didn’t Rav Asi say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If there are nine gentiles and one Jew and a building collapses on one of them, if it is in that same courtyard one removes the debris, but in another courtyard one does not remove the debris? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; there is no contradiction between the halakhot. This case, where one removes the debris, is when they all left for another courtyard and it is clear that the Jew was among them. Consequently, the principle of being in a fixed location still applies, and it is considered a case of uncertainty. That other situation is when only a minority of them left for the other courtyard, and it is unknown whether the Jew left with them.

The Gemara asks: Did Shmuel actually say this, that one does not follow the majority with regard to saving a life? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: If one finds an abandoned child in a city and his parents are unknown, if the majority of the city are gentiles the child is considered a gentile; and if the majority of the city are Jews the child is considered a Jew; if the city is composed of half gentiles and half Jews, the child is considered a Jew? And Rav said: They taught this, that he is a Jew, only with respect to sustaining him but not with respect to attributing a lineage to him. One does not say that he is definitely Jewish based on the majority. Therefore, with regard to the halakhot of marriage, his status remains uncertain. If the abandoned child is a girl, she is not permitted to marry a priest, who may marry only a woman of certain lineage.