דף 118

What is the reasoning of Rav Ḥisda, who holds that the requirement to return the animal with the owner’s knowledge is in the case where the owners did not know about the theft? Since the thief taught the lamb to take steps outside, i.e., to leave the owners’ property, it will now require greater supervision, which the owners can provide only if they are aware of the situation.

The Gemara assumes that since Rava explained Rav Ḥisda’s reasoning, he accepts Rav Ḥisda’s ruling. The Gemara asks: But did Rava actually say this? Doesn’t Rava say that in the case of this person who saw another lift a lamb from his flock in order to steal it, and the owner then raised his voice at the thief, and the thief discarded it, but the owner did not know if the thief returned the lamb or if he did not return it, and the lamb then died or was stolen, the thief is to pay restitution for it?

The Gemara comments: What, is this statement of Rava not applicable even if the owner counted his flock after this incident? Accordingly, Rava rules that if the owner knew about the theft, the thief is rendered exempt from liability only if he returns the lamb with the owner’s knowledge, which is not in accordance with the ruling of Rav Ḥisda. The Gemara answers: No, Rava’s ruling applies only where the owner did not count the flock.

The Gemara examines Rav’s ruling. But did Rav actually say this? Doesn’t Rav say that if the thief returned the lamb to the owner’s flock that is in an unsettled area, he has fulfilled his obligation to return it? This indicates that the thief is exempt from further liability even though the thief did not inform the owner of the lamb’s return and the owner did not count the flock. The Gemara answers that Rav Ḥanan bar Abba said: Rav concedes that the thief is exempt in this case only where the lamb was spotted [birkuata]. Since the lamb’s spots are distinctive, the owner immediately becomes aware of its return.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the amoraic dispute cited previously is parallel to a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: One who steals a lamb from a flock or a sela from a purse must return it to the place from where he stole it; this is the statement of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says: The thief is required to return it with the knowledge of its owners.

The Gemara explains: The Sages discussing the matter assumed that everyone accepts the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzḥak says: A person is prone to feel his purse constantly, and therefore becomes aware of the theft soon after it takes place. What, is it not a case where a sela was stolen with the owner’s knowledge, and the dispute of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva is parallel to the dispute of Rav and Shmuel? According to this explanation, Rav rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and Shmuel rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael.

The Gemara responds: No, they disagree in the case of a lamb that was stolen without the knowledge of its owners, i.e., they did not know that it was stolen, and the dispute of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva is parallel to the dispute of Rav Ḥisda and Rabbi Yoḥanan. Rav Ḥisda rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva that the lamb must be returned with the owner’s knowledge, and Rabbi Yoḥanan rules in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael that the owners do not need to become aware of the lamb’s return.

Rav Zevid said in the name of Rava: With regard to a bailee who stole a lamb from the owner’s domain, everyone, including Rabbi Yishmael, agrees that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ḥisda, and the owner must be aware of the animal’s return in order for the thief to become exempt from further liability. And here it is with regard to whether a bailee who stole from within his own domain may return what he stole to the place from where he stole it that they disagree. Rabbi Akiva holds: His safeguarding was terminated when he stole the lamb and he must therefore return it with the owner’s knowledge. And Rabbi Yishmael holds: His safeguarding was not terminated and he may return it to his own domain.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that with regard to the dispute over whether the owner’s counting of his flock exempts a thief who returned a stolen lamb without notifying the owner, it is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who robbed another and then included the money he owed him for the robbery in the calculation of the payment for a different transaction, i.e., he compensated the owner by overpaying him for a different transaction, it is taught in one baraita: He has fulfilled his obligation to pay, and it is taught in another baraita: He has not fulfilled his obligation to pay.

The Sages discussing the matter assumed that everyone accepts the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzḥak says: A person is prone to feel his purse constantly, and therefore becomes aware that he has been compensated soon after the payment is made. What, is it not with regard to this following point that they disagree: The one who says that the robber has fulfilled his obligation holds that the counting of the property exempts a robber from further liability, and the one who says that the robber has not fulfilled his obligation holds that the counting does not exempt a robber from further liability.

The Gemara responds: One can say that if we held in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, it would follow that everyone agrees that the counting of the property exempts a robber from further liability. Rather, it is with regard to the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak itself that they disagree: One Sage accepts the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, and one Sage does not accept the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak.

And if you wish, say instead that everyone accepts the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, and it is not difficult: This first baraita, which rules that the robber fulfilled his obligation, is discussing a case where the robber counted the money and placed it directly in the owner’s purse, which the owner will soon open and count. And that other baraita, which rules that the robber did not fulfill his obligation, is discussing a case where he counted the money and placed it in the owner’s hand. Consequently, it is possible that the owner will put the money directly into a container with other coins in it and will never realize that he was compensated for the theft.

And if you wish, say instead that both this baraita and that baraita are discussing a case where the robber counted the money and placed it in the owner’s purse. This baraita discusses a case where he has other dinars in his purse, but he did not know how many. Therefore, when he counts the money, he will not realize that the robber inserted an additional sum. Whereas that baraita is discussing a case where he does not have other dinars in his purse, so that when he counts the money he will realize that an additional sum has been included in the payment.

MISHNA: One may not purchase wool, milk, and kids from the shepherds who tend the flocks of others, due to the concern that they have stolen these items from the owners of the flocks. And similarly, one may not purchase wood and produce from produce watchmen.

But one may purchase from women woolen goods in Judea, and linen goods in the Galilee, and calves in the Sharon, as women in these locations often work with those commodities and it can be assumed that they are selling the items with the owner’s consent. And with regard to all these items, in a case where the seller told the buyer to conceal the purchase, it is prohibited, as there is good reason to suspect that the items are stolen. And one may purchase eggs and chickens from everywhere, as it is unlikely that one would steal and sell these commodities.

GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita (Tosefta 11:9): One may purchase from shepherds neither goats, nor kids, nor fleeces, nor torn pieces of wool, but one may purchase sewn garments from them, because they are presumed to be theirs. And one may purchase milk and cheese from them in an unsettled area, but not in a settled area.

And one may purchase from them four or five sheep or four or five fleeces at a time, because it is unlikely that a shepherd would risk stealing such a significant quantity at once. But one may not purchase two sheep, and similarly, one may not purchase two fleeces at a time, as it is reasonable to assume that the shepherd would attempt to steal this amount from the owner.

The baraita continues: Rabbi Yehuda says: One may purchase domesticated animals from them, as it is unlikely that the shepherds would steal them from their owner, who would notice if they did not return home. Conversely, one may not purchase desert, i.e., non-domesticated, animals from them, as it is more likely that a shepherd would steal these animals. The principle of the matter is that with regard to anything that the shepherd sells and the owner would perceive its absence if it were stolen, one may purchase it from them. But if the owner would not perceive its absence, one may not purchase it from them.

The Gemara examines the baraita: The Master said that one may purchase from them four or five sheep or four or five fleeces at a time. Now that it can be said that we may buy four sheep, as it is unlikely that the shepherd would steal such a large quantity at one time, is it necessary to state that we may buy five? The Gemara answers that Rav Ḥisda said: The meaning of the baraita is that one may purchase four sheep out of a flock consisting of five sheep, as it is reasonable to assume that the shepherd would not attempt to steal four-fifths of the owner’s flock. And there are those who say that Rav Ḥisda said as follows: Four sheep may be purchased from the shepherd of a small flock, and five may be purchased from the shepherd of a large flock.

The Gemara asks another question with regard to the baraita: This matter itself is difficult, as you said in the baraita: One may purchase from them four or five sheep or four or five fleeces at a time, which indicates that purchasing four or five, yes, it is permitted, but purchasing three, no, it is prohibited. Say the latter clause: But one may not purchase two sheep. This indicates that we may purchase three sheep at a time.

The Gemara answers that this is not difficult: This clause, which permits the purchase of three sheep, is discussing a case where the sheep are robust, and therefore the owner is more attentive to them and would notice if three were missing. Conversely, that clause, which prohibits the purchase of three sheep, is discussing a case where the sheep are frail. Consequently, the owner does not care about them as much, and it is possible that he would not notice if only three of them went missing.

The baraita teaches that Rabbi Yehuda says: One may purchase domesticated animals from them, but one may not purchase desert animals from them. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda referring to the first clause, and his statement is therefore a stringency? Or perhaps it is referring to the latter clause, and his statement is a leniency?

The Gemara elaborates: Is it referring to the first clause, and his statement is therefore a stringency, as he would be saying: One may purchase four or five sheep from them, and this statement applies only to domesticated animals, but with regard to desert animals, even four or five sheep may not be purchased? Or perhaps it is referring to the latter clause and it is a leniency, as he would be saying: But one may not purchase two sheep, and similarly, one may not purchase two fleeces, and this statement applies only to desert animals, but with regard to domesticated animals, one may purchase even two animals.

The Gemara presents an answer: Come and hear a resolution to the dilemma, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda says: One may purchase domesticated animals from them, but one may not purchase desert animals from them. But one may always purchase four or five sheep from them.