דף 94

of Asporak: Beit Shammai prohibit sacrificing these items and Beit Hillel permit doing so. The Gemara clarifies: What is the reason of Beit Shammai? The Gemara answers: The verse states: “You shall not bring the hire of a harlot or the price of a dog into the House of the Lord your God for any vow; for even both of these are an abomination unto the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 23:19). The word “even” is an amplification, which serves to include in the prohibition these items in their changed form. And what is the reason of Beit Hillel? The verse states “these” to emphasize that the prohibition applies only to these items in their initial form, but not in their changed form.

The Gemara asks: And according to Beit Shammai, isn’t the word “these” written in the verse, indicating an exclusion? The Gemara responds: Beit Shammai requires that word to indicate that “these” items are forbidden, but not the offspring of animals given as payment to the prostitute. The Gemara asks: And according to Beit Hillel, what is the source of that halakha? The Gemara answers: According to Beit Hillel, you learn two halakhot from this word, as follows: “These” items are forbidden in their initial form but not in their changed form, and “these” items are forbidden but not their offspring.

The Gemara asks: And according to Beit Hillel as well, isn’t the word “even” written in the verse, indicating an amplification? The Gemara answers: Indeed, the word “even” is difficult for Beit Hillel. It is not clear how they would interpret that word.

The Gemara continues: What is the source that indicates that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov holds that an item that undergoes a change is still considered to have the same status that it had before the change?

The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: In the case of one who robbed another of a se’a of wheat, then ground it, kneaded it, and baked it, and he then separated ḥalla from it, i.e., he separated the portion of the dough that one is required to separate and then give to a priest, how can he recite the blessing over the separation of ḥalla? This individual is not reciting a blessing, but rather he is blaspheming. And with regard to this it is stated: “The robber who recites a blessing blasphemes the Lord” (Psalms 10:3), which is referring to a robber who recites a blessing upon performing a mitzva with an item he stole. According to Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, although this wheat has been significantly changed, it is still considered a stolen item.

The Gemara continues: What is the source that indicates that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar holds that an item that undergoes a change is still considered to have the same status that it had before the change? As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta 10:2) that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated this principle: With regard to any enhancement to the stolen animal in that it was enhanced by the actions of the robber, he has the advantage when repaying the owner. If he desires, he takes his enhancement, i.e., when he returns the animal, the robbery victim must pay the difference between its value at the time of the robbery and its current value, and if he desires he can return it to the owner and say to him: That which is yours is before you.

The Gemara expresses surprise: What is he saying? If the robber has a right to demand compensation for the enhancement to the animal, why would he ever return it without stating this demand? Rav Sheshet said that this is what he is saying: If the robber enhanced it, he takes his enhancement. If the animal was weakened, the robber says to him: That which is yours is before you, and no further compensation is required. This is because despite a change, the changed item remains in its place. Since the robber has not acquired it, he simply returns the item to the robbery victim.

The Gemara asks: If so, i.e., if the robber has not acquired it, then even if he enhanced it that should be the halakha as well. The item should still belong to the robbery victim and the robber should not be entitled to compensation. The Sages say in response: The fact that the robber has a right to demand compensation for the enhancement is due to an ordinance instituted for the penitent. In order to ease the burden of one who desires to repent, the Sages instituted that the robber be reimbursed for the increase in the value of the animal. Otherwise, a robber might refrain from returning a stolen item.

The Gemara continues: What is the source that indicates that Rabbi Yishmael holds that an item that undergoes a change is still considered to have the same status that it had before the change? The Gemara answers: As it is taught in a baraita: The ideal way to fulfill the mitzva of produce in the corner of the field, which is given to the poor [pe’a], is to separate it from the standing grain, i.e., grain that has not been harvested. If one did not separate it from the standing grain, he separates it from the sheaves of grain that have already been harvested. If he did not separate it from the sheaves, he separates it from the pile of grain, as long as he has not yet smoothed the pile.

If he smoothed the pile of grain, activating the obligation to tithe the produce, he first tithes the grain and then gives a portion of the tithed produce to the poor as pe’a, so that the poor will not have to tithe what they receive. Additionally, they said in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: If he did not separate pe’a during any of the aforementioned stages and he made a dough from the grain, he separates pe’a even from the dough and gives it to the poor. This indicates that even if the grain was changed, one is not exempt from the obligation of pe’a. The Gemara has now clarified the sources Abaye alluded to when he listed all the tanna’im who hold that despite a change, the changed item remains in its place.

Rav Pappa said to Abaye: Did all these tanna’im go to so much trouble in an effort [ikhpal] to teach us a halakha in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, which is presumably not accepted as normative? Abaye said to Rav Pappa: This is what they are saying: Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not engage in a dispute with regard to this matter. All of the aforementioned tanna’im hold that even Beit Hillel agree that a change in the form of an item does not impact its status.

Rava said: From where can it be proven that all of the aforementioned tanna’im hold that an item that undergoes a change is still considered to have the same status that it had before the change? One can say that the reasons for their statements are due to other factors. Perhaps Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda states his opinion, that it is not a significant change, there, in the case of the first of the sheared wool, only with regard to dye, which is a reversible change, since one is able to remove it with soap.

And perhaps Beit Shammai state their opinion there, in the case of a harlot, only with regard to an offering to the Most High, because of the fact that the item has become repugnant, in being used as payment for the services of a prostitute, and therefore it cannot be used for an offering even if its form has changed.

And perhaps Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov states his opinion there, where one robbed another of wheat, only with regard to a blessing, because this is a mitzva that is performed through commission of a transgression, but this does not indicate that a change is insignificant with regard to other matters.

And perhaps Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar states his opinion there, where the condition of the animal changed, only with regard to weakening of the animal that is reversible. Since the animal’s value can be restored by fattening it, the weakening is not deemed a significant change.

And perhaps Rabbi Yishmael states his opinion there, where one separated pe’a at a late stage, only with regard to pe’a, because it is written: “You shall leave them for the poor” an additional time. It is mentioned twice, in Leviticus 19:10 and Leviticus 23:22. One of these terms is superfluous, indicating that pe’a must be given to the poor under all circumstances, even if the grain was changed and made into dough. And if you would say: Let us derive from pe’a that in other halakhic domains the status of an item is not affected by its undergoing a change, pe’a cannot function as a source because gifts to the poor are different from other halakhot.

The Gemara notes: Rava’s claim that no definitive conclusion with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael concerning a changed item is supported by the statement of another amora is like the dilemma raised by Rabbi Yonatan, as Rabbi Yonatan raises a dilemma: What is the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Yishmael? Is it because he holds that change does not cause one to acquire an item? Or perhaps he generally holds that change does cause one to acquire an item, but here, in the case of pe’a, it is different because the term “You shall leave” is written an additional time.

Having quoted Rabbi Yonatan’s dilemma, the Gemara asks: And if you say that the reason for the ruling of Rabbi Yishmael is that he holds that change does not cause one to acquire an item, why do I need the additional term “You shall leave,” which the Merciful One writes in the Torah? And furthermore, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that pe’a may not be taken from dough, why do I need the additional term “You shall leave” that the Merciful One writes?

The Gemara responds: This additional term is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: One who renounced ownership of his vineyard and arose early in the morning before anyone else took possession of it and harvested it is obligated in the mitzva of individual fallen grapes left for the poor [peret], and in the mitzva of incompletely formed clusters of grapes left for the poor [olelot], and in the mitzva of forgotten clusters of grapes left for the poor and in the mitzva of pe’a. These are the four gifts to the poor that the Torah requires one to give from a vineyard. But he is exempt from the mitzva to tithe his produce, because this requirement does not apply to an ownerless field. The obligation to give gifts to the poor in this case is derived from the additional mention of the term “You shall leave.”

§ The Gemara returns to the discussion of a stolen item that underwent a change. Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who says that even if the stolen animal deteriorated, it is returned to the owner in its current state.

The Gemara expresses surprise: But did Shmuel actually say this? But doesn’t Shmuel say: One does not appraise the change in value, neither for a thief nor for a robber. Rather, they keep the stolen animal and pay back the victim with their own money; one appraises the change only for one obligated to pay for damage?

Granted, according to the opinion of Rava, who said earlier in response to Abaye: When Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar states his opinion there, he stated it only with regard to weakening of the animal that is reversible, this is not difficult: When Shmuel says that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who holds that despite a change, the changed item remains in its place, he stated this with regard to weakening of the animal which is reversible, in which case the change is insignificant. And when Shmuel says there: One does not appraise the change in value, neither for a thief nor for a robber, but rather one appraises the change only for one obligated to pay for damage, he stated this with regard to weakening of the animal that is irreversible.

But according to Abaye, who said that when Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar states his opinion, he states it even with regard to weakening of the animal which is irreversible, what can be said?

The Gemara responds: Abaye taught the statement of Shmuel like this: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: