דף 11

The Gemara explains: It is possible that even the first tanna holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar that the witnesses who observe its transmission effect the divorce, and he does not dispute Rabbi Shimon on this point. Instead, the difference between the first tanna and Rabbi Shimon concerns a case where the signatures on the bill of divorce are unambiguous [muvhakin] gentile names. The first tanna holds that although a bill of divorce is valid if it was transmitted in the presence of valid witnesses, there is always a concern that it might have been transmitted in the presence of the same gentile witnesses who signed it. Therefore, it is rendered invalid by rabbinic law. Conversely, Rabbi Shimon holds that if it contained names that clearly belonged to gentiles it can be assumed that the bill of divorce was transmitted in the presence of two valid witnesses, and therefore it is valid.

The Gemara raises another difficulty: But the halakha of retraction applies by Torah law, as according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir the husband can retract his instruction to give the bill of divorce and the master can retract his instruction to give the bill of manumission by Torah law, thereby canceling the agency. And yet the baraita teaches it among the ways in which bills of divorce are equal to bills of manumission. This indicates that the tanna does not distinguish between a case that applies by Torah law and one that applies by rabbinic law.

Rather, the Gemara retracts from the previous explanation in favor of the following: When the baraita teaches the ways in which the two are equal it teaches only a matter that does not apply with regard to the halakhot of betrothal; however, it does not teach a matter that does apply with regard to the halakhot of betrothal.

The Gemara challenges: But retraction itself is also applicable with regard to betrothal, as one who sent a betrothal document with an agent can retract it. The Gemara says: The halakha of agency in the case of betrothal is not the same as that of divorce, as there is a difference with regard to agency undertaken to enact a matter against the recipient’s will. If one appointed an agent for a matter that the recipient does not want, e.g., to betroth a woman against her will or to free a slave against his will, as with regard to divorce, it is a valid agency, as a bill of divorce need not be given with the woman’s consent, but with regard to betrothal it is not a valid agency, as a woman can be betrothed only with her consent.

MISHNA: Any document that has a Samaritan witness signed on it is invalid, except for bills of divorce and bills of manumission. An incident occurred in which they brought a bill of divorce before Rabban Gamliel in the village of Otnai, and its witnesses were Samaritan witnesses, and he deemed it valid.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is not the opinion of the first tanna, nor that of Rabbi Elazar, nor that of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, cited in the following baraita.

As it is taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Pesaḥim 1:15): The matza of a Samaritan is permitted on Passover, as there is no concern that it might be leaven, and a person fulfills his obligation to eat matza on the first night of Passover with it. Rabbi Elazar prohibits the consumption of the matza of a Samaritan because the Samaritans are not well-versed in the details of mitzvot. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: On the contrary, with regard to any mitzva that the Samaritans embraced and accepted, they are more exacting in its observance than are Jews.

The Gemara elaborates: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? If it is the opinion of the first tanna in the baraita, then even other documents should be valid when signed by Samaritan witnesses. By ruling that one can fulfill his obligation with Samaritan matza, this tanna apparently holds that the status of Samaritans is the same as that of Jews. If so, that should be their status with regard to their testimony on any document. If the opinion in the mishna is that of Rabbi Elazar, who expresses the concern that Samaritans are not well versed in the details of mitzvot, they should not be fit to sign even a bill of divorce.

And if the opinion in the mishna is that of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, the halakha should depend on the following consideration: If they embrace and accept the mitzva associated with the subject of the document, even with regard to other documents their testimony should be valid; if they do not embrace and accept the mitzva associated with the subject of the document, they should not be rendered fit to sign even a bill of divorce.

And if you would say that the opinion in the mishna is that of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and the Samaritans embrace this mitzva of bills of divorce, but they do not embrace this mitzva associated with the subject of other documents, if so, why is a bill of divorce valid specifically in a case where only one Samaritan witness signed it? The same would hold true even if two Samaritan witnesses signed the bill of divorce as well. Why, then, does Rabbi Elazar say: The Sages deemed it valid only when there is just one Samaritan witness signed on the bill of divorce?

The Gemara answers: Actually, the opinion expressed in the mishna is that of Rabbi Elazar, and as a rule, one may not rely on the testimony of a Samaritan on a document. And the mishna is referring to a case where a Jew signed the document last,