דף 44

Perhaps he will admit his obligation and become exempt from his obligation to pay, for one who admits that he is required to pay a penalty before the court obligates him to pay it is exempt.

And you could raise this dilemma according to the opinion of the Rabbis as well, as the Rabbis state that a person cannot transfer ownership of an entity that has not yet come into the world only in a case such as the produce of a date palm, which now, at least, is not in the world. However, here, the ox is standing and the slave is standing, and there is no need for any change in the reality. What is the halakha in this case?

Rabbi Abba said: Come and hear a proof based on a halakhic exposition of the verse that details those who may partake of teruma. The verse states: “But if a priest buys any person, the purchase of his money, he may eat of it; and those who are born in his house, they may eat of his bread” (Leviticus 22:11), and the Sages expound as follows: What is the meaning when the verse states: “And those who are born in his house”? If a slave, who is the purchase of his money, may partake of teruma, then in the case of those slaves who are born to the priest in his house, is it not all the more so that they should be able to partake of teruma?

The baraita continues: If so, if the halakha that a born slave may partake of teruma is derived only due to this a fortiori inference, I would have said: Just as with regard to the purchase of his money it is only one who has monetary value that partakes, so too, with regard to one born in his house, only one who has monetary value partakes. And from where is it derived that the same halakha applies when a born slave is not worth anything, e.g., in the case of a newborn, who cannot perform any labor? The verse states: “Those who are born in his house,” in any case, regardless of their present monetary value.

The baraita continues: And I still say that perhaps one born in the priest’s house may partake of teruma whether he has monetary value or whether he does not have monetary value. But with regard to a slave purchased of the priest’s money, when he has monetary value, he may partake; when he does not have monetary value, he may not partake. The verse states: “The purchase of his money…and those who are born in his house, they may eat of his bread” (Leviticus 22:11). The verse compares the two, indicating: Just as one born in the priest’s house may partake of teruma although he is not worth anything, so too, the purchase of his money may partake of teruma although he is not worth anything. In any event, it is clear from this baraita that it is possible for a slave to have no monetary value.

Rabbi Abba now states his proof. And if it enters your mind to say that a slave whose master sold him to another person only with regard to the penalty is sold, is there a slave that cannot be sold with regard to the penalty? Even if he cannot perform any labor, he still has value in that he can be sold with regard to the penalty. The Gemara answers: Yes, there is the case of a slave who has a wound that will cause him to die within twelve months [tereifa]. Since he will die from an injury that is already present, one would not be required to pay a penalty if one’s ox gored him.

The Gemara challenges: But isn’t he fit to stand before his master in honor, even if he cannot perform any other service, so he has some value as a slave? The Gemara answers: This baraita is referring to a slave who is not only a tereifa and for whom there is no penalty, but is also disgusting [menuvval] or afflicted with boils [mukeh sheḥin]. It would not be a display of honor for the slave to stand before the master, and therefore he is worthless. This question of the Gemara remains unresolved.

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of one who is a half-slave half-freeman who betrothed a free woman, what is the halakha? The Gemara discusses the elements of this question: If you say that this should be compared to a Jewish man who said to a Jewish woman: Become betrothed to half of me, and the halakha is that she is betrothed, this is because she is fit to marry all of him. However, in this case one could say that she is not fit to marry all of him because he is a half-slave, so it is not a valid betrothal.

However, if you say that this should be compared to the case of a Jewish man who betroths half a woman, where the halakha is that she is not betrothed because he left a portion of the woman out of his acquisition, as betrothal acquires a complete woman and not half of a woman, but this slave did not leave any part of her out of his acquisition, as his Jewish half betrothed her fully. What is the halakha in this case?

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof based on that which is taught in a baraita: If an ox killed a half-slave half-freeman, then the owner of the ox gives half of a penalty, i.e., fifteen shekels, to his master and half of a ransom, i.e., half of the value of the deceased, to his heirs. And if you say that his betrothal is not a valid betrothal, and the half-slave half-freeman may not marry a woman, then from where does he have heirs? It must be that he may betroth and marry a woman, and as a result he can have heirs.

Rav Adda bar Ahava says: This is referring to a case where the ox did not actually kill him. Rather, it made him a tereifa, and a tereifa is like a dead person. And what is the meaning of: His heirs? It means the half-slave half-freeman himself.

Rava said that there are two refutations of your statement: One is that it teaches: His heirs, and it is not reasonable to say that this is referring to the victim himself. And furthermore, it is referring to ransom here, and Reish Lakish says: Ransom is paid only after the death of the victim but not while he is still alive, even if he is a tereifa. Rather, Rava says: When the baraita states that half of the ransom is given to his heirs, it means that it is fitting for heirs to take the ransom, but he does not actually have heirs.

§ Rava says: Just as the halakha is that in the case of one who betroths half a woman, she is not betrothed, so too, if there is a half-maidservant half-free woman who was betrothed, then her betrothal is not a valid betrothal.

The Gemara says: Rabba bar Rav Huna taught this halakha in public: Just as the halakha is that in the case of one who betroths half a woman, she is not betrothed, so too, if there is a half-maidservant half-free woman who was betrothed, then her betrothal is not a valid betrothal. Rav Ḥisda said to him as a question: Are the cases comparable? There, where he betroths half a woman, he leaves a portion of the woman out of his acquisition. That is why the betrothal does not take effect. However, here, she was a half-maidservant half-free woman when he betrothed her, and he did not leave a portion of the woman out of his acquisition, so the betrothal should take effect.

Rabba bar Rav Huna went back and placed an interpreter before him so that he could tell the public that he had been wrong, and he interpreted a verse homiletically. The verse states: “And let this stumbling-block be under your hand” (Isaiah 3:6). A person does not understand statements of Torah unless he stumbles in them. Therefore, I retract my previous statement and say that although the Sages said that in the case of one who betroths half a woman, she is not betrothed, however, if there was a half-maidservant half-free woman who was betrothed, then her betrothal is a valid betrothal. What is the reason for the distinction? There, he left a portion of the woman out of his acquisition; here, he did not leave a portion of the woman out of his acquisition.

Rav Sheshet said in response to this: Just as the halakha is that in the case of one who betroths half a woman, she is not betrothed, so too, if there is a half-maidservant half-free woman who was betrothed, then her betrothal is not a valid betrothal. And if a person whispers to you [leḥashekha], saying, based on what was taught in a baraita: Who is the designated maidservant mentioned in the Torah? This is a woman who is a half-maidservant half-free woman who is betrothed to a Hebrew slave, apparently indicating that she can be betrothed, then say to him: Go to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, for he says that this is not referring to a woman who is a half-slave, but rather to a Canaanite maidservant betrothed to a Hebrew slave.

Rav Sheshet questions his own statement: But can a Canaanite maidservant be betrothed? Rather, what have you to say: What is the meaning of the word betrothed in the statement of Rabbi Yishmael? It means that she is designated for him, and it is not actual betrothal. Here, also, in the baraita, what does it mean that the Canaanite maidservant is betrothed to a Hebrew slave? It means that she is designated to cohabit with him, but they are not in fact betrothed.

Rav Ḥisda says: If there was a half-maidservant half-free woman who was betrothed to Reuven, and afterward she was emancipated entirely, and she went back and was betrothed to Shimon his brother, and both brothers died without children, then she enters into levirate marriage with Levi, the third brother, because she was considered to be the complete wife of only one of the brothers,