דף 62

disagree with regard to this verse, which is stated with regard to a different offering: “And it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him” (Leviticus 1:4). It is inferred: For him and not for his fellow. One cannot achieve atonement through an offering that has been designated for someone else. Rabba and Rav Ḥisda disagree with regard to the halakhic conclusions that should be drawn from this law. Rabba holds that the law applies to another who is similar to him: Just as he is eligible for atonement through the sprinkling of the blood of this offering, so the law applies to another who is eligible for atonement. This comes to exclude this uncircumcised person, who is not eligible for atonement. Since an uncircumcised person is not fit for the Paschal lamb, slaughtering it for him does not disqualify the offering.

And Rav Ḥisda holds that with regard to this uncircumcised person as well, since he is obligated to bring the Paschal lamb, he is considered eligible for atonement through the Paschal lamb. Why is an uncircumcised person seen as obligated to bring the Paschal lamb? Since if he wants, he can make himself fit through circumcision, and the obligation will automatically apply to him. There is a way for him to include himself among those who eat the offering; therefore, he cannot categorically be considered someone who is not eligible for atonement. Consequently, slaughtering the Paschal lamb for him disqualifies the offering.

The Gemara challenges this explanation: But does Rav Ḥisda accept this argument of since? Does he maintain that one can discuss a situation that does not exist due to the possibility that the present circumstances might change? But it was said that Rabba and Rav Ḥisda disagree about this as it pertains to the case of one who bakes on a Festival for use during the week: Rav Ḥisda said he is flogged for having violated the Festival by baking in order to eat the food on a weekday; Rabba said he is not flogged.

The Gemara explains: Rabba said he is not flogged for the following reason: Since if guests arrive, whatever he bakes will be fit for him to use on the Festival itself, and he will not be guilty of any transgression, now too, although guests have not yet arrived, the food is considered fit for him, and he is not flogged. At the time of the baking, the act was not unequivocally prohibited. Rav Ḥisda said he is flogged; we do not state the principle of since. At first glance, there is an internal contradiction with regard to the opinions of both Rabba and Rav Ḥisda.

The Gemara notes: Granted, the apparent contradiction between the first statement of Rabba and the second statement of Rabba is not difficult. Here, in the case of the Paschal lamb whose blood is sprinkled for an uncircumcised person, an action is lacking, as the person must undergo circumcision in order to become eligible to eat from the Paschal lamb. However, there, in the case of one who bakes on a Festival, no action is lacking on the part of the baker. But the first statement of Rav Ḥisda and the second statement of Rav Ḥisda are difficult to reconcile. They say, in answer to this contradiction: When Rav Ḥisda does not accept the principle of since, it is only to be lenient and exempt a person from lashes; however, to be stringent and disqualify the Paschal lamb, he does accept this line of reasoning.

Mar Zutra, son of Rav Mari, said to Ravina: The baraita quoted above teaches: Since lack of circumcision disqualifies a Paschal lamb and ritual impurity also disqualifies it, the following comparison applies: Just as in the case of ritual impurity, partial impurity was not made to be like full impurity, so too, in the case of lack of circumcision, partial lack of circumcision was not made to be like full lack of circumcision. The Gemara clarifies: With regard to this ritual impurity, what are the circumstances? If you say that the baraita is referring to the ritual impurity of the people who registered for the offering, then there is a difficulty. For what then is the meaning of the ruling in the baraita that partial impurity was not made to be like full impurity? It means that if there are four or five people who are impure and four or five people who are pure, those who are impure do not disqualify those who are pure.

This, however, is difficult, as with regard to lack of circumcision as well, those who are uncircumcised do not disqualify the offering, as we learned in a mishna: If one slaughtered the Paschal lamb for both circumcised and uncircumcised people, it is valid. What is different about the halakha with regard to impurity, that there it is obvious to him that those who are ritually impure do not disqualify the members of their group who are pure? And what is different about the halakha with regard to lack of circumcision, that there he is in doubt about the halakha?

Rather, the baraita must certainly be explained as referring to the impurity of the meat of the offering. And what is the meaning of the ruling in the baraita that partial impurity was not made to be like full impurity? It means that if one of the limbs became impure, that which became impure we burn and the rest we eat.

This conclusion is challenged: How did you establish this baraita? It was established as referring to a case of impurity of the meat. If so, say the latter clause of the same baraita as follows: We derive a matter that does not apply to all offerings, the case of uncircumcised men, from a matter that does not apply to all offerings, namely ritual impurity, and the halakha with regard to intent to eat the offering outside the allotted time, which applies to all offerings, should not be used to prove anything about the case at hand. Now, what type of impurity is being discussed here? If we say that it is impurity of the meat, why do you say that it does not apply to all offerings? This halakha certainly applies to all offerings.

Rather, it is obvious that the clause under discussion relates to impurity of the people who are to eat from the offering. And what is the meaning of the statement that it does not apply to all offerings? It means that with regard to all offerings, an uncircumcised person and one who is ritually impure cannot eat from the offering, but nonetheless they can send their offerings with others who can sacrifice them on their behalf; however, with regard to the Paschal lamb, an uncircumcised person and one who is impure cannot send their offerings. Consequently, the Gemara arrives at the surprising conclusion that the first clause of the baraita is referring to impurity of the meat, while the latter clause of the baraita relates to impurity of the people.

Ravina said to Mar Zutra: Yes, this explanation can be accepted. The baraita can be understood as arguing from the general category of impurity, which applies in one case and not in another, rather than from a specific type of impurity in both cases.

And if you wish, say a different answer: The latter clause is also referring to impurity of the meat. And what is the meaning of the statement that it does not apply to all offerings? It means that with regard to all offerings, whether the fats of the offering that are burned on the altar have become impure and the meat of the offering remains, or the meat has become impure and the fats remain, the priest may sprinkle the blood, and the offering is accepted through the burning of the sacrificial parts or through the priests’ consumption of the meat.

However, when it comes to the Paschal lamb, if the fats have become impure and the meat remains pure and fit to be eaten, the priest may sprinkle the blood; but if the meat has become impure and the fats remain pure and fit to be burned on the altar, he may not sprinkle the blood, because in the case of the Paschal lamb, the owner’s obligation to eat the meat is the essence of the offering.

The Gemara asks: How did you establish this baraita? It was established as referring to a case of impurity of the meat. If so, say the next clause of this same baraita as follows: We derive a matter, i.e., the halakha with regard to uncircumcised people, for which no allowance is made from its rule, from a matter, i.e., improper intent with regard to the time, for which no allowance is made from its rule. And the halakha with regard to ritual impurity should not be used to prove anything, as there are circumstances in which an allowance is made from its rule, since it is permitted to offer the Paschal lamb while ritually impure. The Gemara clarifies: What type of impurity is being discussed here? If you say that it is