דף 65

This verse indicates that blood with which life leaves the animal, meaning blood that spurts immediately upon slaughter, makes atonement when it is sprinkled on the altar; however, blood with which life does not leave the animal, meaning blood that drains out after the initial spurt, does not make atonement. In that case, even Rabbi Yehuda should be concerned that the blood collected in the cup contains blood squeezed from an animal after the initial spurt concluded. Rather, Rabbi Yehuda conforms to his line of reasoning, as he said: Blood does not nullify blood. The small amount of blood in the cup that is fit for sprinkling on the altar is not nullified even if most of the blood in the cup is blood squeezed from an animal after the initial spurt concluded. Therefore, it may still be sprinkled upon the altar and make atonement.

It was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said to the Rabbis: According to your statement that there is no need to fill a cup of blood from the floor, why did they plug the drains of the Temple courtyard on Passover eve and not let the blood flow immediately into the drainage pipes? They said to him: It is praiseworthy of the sons of Aaron, the priests, to walk in blood up to their ankles, thereby demonstrating their love for the Temple rite.

The Gemara asks: How could they walk in blood up to their ankles? Doesn’t the blood interpose between the feet of the priests and the floor of the Temple and thereby invalidate the rite? The Gemara answers: The blood is moist and therefore it does not interpose. As it was taught in a baraita: With regard to blood, ink, milk, and honey, when they are dry, they interpose with respect to ritual immersion and other matters; when they are moist, they do not interpose.

The Gemara asks further: But don’t their garments become soiled? And we learned in a mishna: If the priest’s garments were soiled and he performed the Temple rite while wearing them, his rite is invalid, because the priestly garments must be fine and beautiful. And if you say that they raised their garments so that the garments would stay clean, there is a difficulty. Wasn’t it taught in a different baraita that explicates the verse: “And the priest shall put on his linen garment [middo]” (Leviticus 6:3), that the verse uses the word middo to teach that the garments must be according to his measure [kemiddato], fitted to his size, not too short and not too long? If the priest raises his garments, they will no longer be exactly his size. The Gemara answers that the priests would walk in the blood while carrying the sacrificial limbs to the ramp of the altar, which is not actually a rite, but only preparation for a rite.

The Gemara asks: And is it not one of the rites? But from the fact that this task requires priesthood, as it can be performed only by a priest, the implication is that it is considered a rite. As it was taught in a baraita with regard to the verse: “And the priest shall bring it all and burn it upon the altar; it is a burnt-offering, an offering made by fire, of a satisfying aroma to the Lord” (Leviticus 1:13), that this is referring to the carrying of the limbs to the ramp. Rather, we must say that the priests would walk in the blood while carrying wood to the wood pile on the altar, which is not a rite.

The Gemara asks: But if the floor of the Temple was full of blood, how did they walk without soiling their garments while carrying the limbs to the ramp and while carrying the blood to the altar? The Gemara answers: They would walk on platforms raised above the floor and thereby avoid soiling their clothes.

It was taught in the mishna how one would suspend and flay the Paschal lamb, and that after the flaying he would tear it open and remove its sacrificial parts and then place them in a large basin in order to burn them. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that he himself, the priest who placed the sacrificial parts in the basin and no one else, would burn them? The Gemara answers: Correct the wording of the mishna to say: In order to burn them on the altar, meaning that he would place them in a large basin as preparation for their being burned on the altar, but not that he himself would necessarily burn them.

It was also stated in the mishna: The first group exited the Temple courtyard with their Paschal lambs. It was taught in a baraita: Each and every one would place his Paschal lamb in its hide and cast it over his shoulder behind him and carry it home that way. Rav Ilish said: They carried it home in the manner of Arab merchants [tayya’ut].

English translation not yet available

MISHNA: These are the matters related to the Paschal lamb that override Shabbat, when the eve of Passover occurs on Shabbat: Its slaughter, the sprinkling of its blood, the cleaning of its intestines and the burning of its fats on the altar, all of which are services that must be performed on Passover eve while it is still day. However, its roasting and the washing of its intestines, which need not be done by day, do not override Shabbat; rather, one waits until after Shabbat to perform these tasks. Carrying the Paschal lamb through a public domain does not override Shabbat. The Paschal offering consisted of either a lamb or a goat, sometimes quite young and unable to walk the entire way, so that it had to be carried on a person’s shoulders. Similarly, bringing it from outside the Shabbat limit and cutting off its wart do not override Shabbat, as all these tasks could have been performed before Shabbat. A wart is considered a blemish that disqualifies the animal from being brought as an offering, but once the wart is removed, the animal is fit to be sacrificed on the altar. Rabbi Eliezer says: All of these procedures override Shabbat.

Rabbi Eliezer said: Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference? If slaughter, which is ordinarily forbidden on Shabbat as a biblically prohibited labor, nonetheless overrides Shabbat when performed for the sake of the Paschal lamb, then these activities, namely carrying the animal, bringing it from outside the Shabbat limit, and the like, which are prohibited due to rabbinic decree, should they not override Shabbat? Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: The law governing a Festival proves otherwise, for the Torah permitted on it acts that are normally prohibited as labor, such as slaughtering, cooking, and baking, and yet it is forbidden to do on it acts that are prohibited due to rabbinic decree. Thus, we cannot derive policy with regard to rabbinic prohibitions from the rules that govern Torah laws.

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: What is this, Yehoshua? How can you suggest such a weak proof? What proof can be deduced from optional activities that would apply to a mitzva? How does the fact that rabbinic decrees remain in effect on a Festival with respect to optional activities prove that one is also forbidden to transgress a rabbinic decree in order to fulfill the mitzva of offering the Paschal lamb? Rabbi Akiva responded and said in defense of Rabbi Yehoshua’s opinion: Sprinkling the purifying water of a red heifer upon someone who had contracted ritual impurity through contact with a corpse proves the matter, for it is done for the sake of a mitzva, in order to allow the person to offer the Paschal lamb, and it is prohibited only due to rabbinic decree, and nonetheless it does not override Shabbat, for the purification rite is not performed on the eve of Passover that falls on Shabbat. So, too, you should not be surprised about these activities, namely carrying the animal, bringing it from outside the Shabbat limit, and cutting off its wart, that although they are performed for the sake of a mitzva and they are prohibited only due to rabbinic decree, they do not override Shabbat.

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: I do not accept this proof. With regard to this sprinkling itself, I infer that it, too, is permitted for the same reason: If slaughter, which is a biblically prohibited labor, overrides Shabbat, is it not right that sprinkling the purifying water of a red heifer, which is prohibited only due to rabbinic decree, should override Shabbat? You cannot challenge me based on a premise with which I disagree.