דף 91

promiscuity, i.e., homosexual behavior.

The Gemara returns to discuss the matter itself, i.e., the baraita partly cited previously, the full version of which states: A woman; on the first Pesaḥ, one slaughters the Paschal lamb on her behalf even if she is by herself. And on the second Pesaḥ, we make her ancillary to others, i.e., she may join others in a group registered for a Paschal lamb but we do not slaughter a lamb on her behalf if she is by herself; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: A woman; on the second Pesaḥ, one slaughters the Paschal lamb on her behalf even if she is by herself. And needless to say we also slaughter on her behalf even if she is by herself on the first Pesaḥ. Rabbi Shimon says: A woman; on the first Pesaḥ we make her ancillary to others, and on the second Pesaḥ we do not slaughter on her behalf at all.

With regard to what do they disagree? The Gemara explains that they disagree about how to interpret the various verses that refer to the first and second Pesaḥ: Rabbi Yehuda holds that the use of the word souls in the verse: “According to the number of the souls…you shall make your count for the lamb” (Exodus 12:4), includes everyone, and even women, in the first Pesaḥ. And if you say that if so, even on the second Pesaḥ, women should also be included, but it is written with regard to one who had not offered a Paschal lamb on the first Pesaḥ and then neglected to bring one on the second Pesaḥ: “That man shall bear his sin” (Numbers 9:13), which indicates that a man, yes, he is liable for not having brought a Paschal lamb on the second Pesaḥ, but a woman, no, she is not liable.

And if you say that if so, a woman should be totally excluded from participating in the second Pesaḥ, and even in a group in an ancillary manner on the second Pesaḥ she should have no part, this is not correct, because the verse states: “According to the entire statute of the Paschal lamb they shall offer it” (Numbers 9:12). The verse compares the first Pesaḥ to the second, and it is therefore effective to enable women to be included in a group in a merely ancillary manner.

And Rabbi Yosei, what is the reason for his opinion? As it is written with regard to the first Pesaḥ: “According to the number of the souls,” which includes even a woman. And it is written with regard to the second Pesaḥ: “The man who is ritually pure, and is not on a journey, and refrains from offering the Paschal lamb, that same soul shall be cut off from among his people” (Numbers 9:13). The word soul includes even women. But if so, the conclusion of that verse, which states: “That man shall bear his sin,” which appears to emphasize that specifically a man is liable for not participating in the second Pesaḥ, is there to exclude what case? It is there to exclude a minor who did not participate in the Paschal lamb from the punishment of karet.

And Rabbi Shimon, what is the reason for his opinion? It is written in a verse concerning the first Pesaḥ “man.” This teaches that a man, yes, a Paschal lamb may be brought on his behalf alone, but a woman, no. And if you say that if so, a woman should be totally excluded from participating even in a group in an ancillary manner, this is not correct, because the verse states: “According to the number of the souls,” which certainly includes women, and it is therefore effective to enable women to be included in a group in an ancillary manner.

And if you say that according to this, even on the second Pesaḥ women should be able to participate as part of a group, this is not correct, because the Torah excludes women from participating on the second Pesaḥ, as it is written: “That man shall bear his sin.” This indicates that a man, yes; a woman, no. From what precisely does the verse exclude women? If you say it is from the obligation to participate in the second Pesaḥ, this cannot be. Since now, on the first Pesaḥ, a woman has no obligation, on the second Pesaḥ is it necessary to say that a woman is not obligated? This is obvious, since the second Pesaḥ exists only as a second opportunity for those who neglected to participate in the first Pesaḥ. Rather, is it not clear that the verse excludes women from participating even in an ancillary fashion?

The Gemara clarifies the source for Rabbi Shimon’s opinion that women are excluded also from the first Pesaḥ. And what is the verse that employs the term “man” that Rabbi Shimon spoke of with regard to the first Pesaḥ? If we say that he is referring to the verse: “They shall take to them every man a lamb, according to their fathers’ houses, a lamb for a household” (Exodus 12:3), this is incorrect, because he needs that verse for the derivation of Rabbi Yitzḥak, who said: We learn from that verse that only a man, i.e., an adult, can acquire an object on behalf of others; but a minor cannot acquire on behalf of others.

Rather, perhaps Rabbi Shimon derived his halakha from the verse: “According to every man’s eating you shall make your count for the lamb” (Exodus 12:4). This is problematic. Since Rabbi Yosei holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, that a Paschal lamb cannot be offered on an improvised altar, presumably Rabbi Shimon also holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, that a Paschal lamb can be slaughtered for an individual. If so, Rabbi Shimon needs that verse, “according to every man’s eating,” in order to teach that we may slaughter the Paschal lamb for an individual, since that verse is the source of Rabbi Yosei’s halakha.

The Gemara justifies that Rabbi Shimon does indeed use the verse as the source of his opinion with regard to the first Pesaḥ: Rabbi Shimon could have said to you: If so, if it were true that the verse was only meant to teach Rabbi Yosei’s halakha concerning improvised altars, the Torah should have simply written: According to his eating, which is phrased in the singular and therefore indicates that the Paschal lamb may be slaughtered for an individual. What then is the significance of the additional term “man”? It must be that you learn from the verse two separate halakhot, that the Paschal lamb may be slaughtered for an individual and that it must be for a man and not a woman.

In accordance with whose opinion is that which Rabbi Elazar said: A woman’s participation in the first Pesaḥ is mandatory, and her participation in the second Pesaḥ is optional and overrides Shabbat? Before resolving this question, the Gemara questions whether Rabbi Elazar’s opinion is even reasonable: If offering the second Pesaḥ is optional for a woman, why does it override Shabbat? Rather, emend his statement and say: A woman’s participation in the second Pesaḥ is optional, and her participation in the first Pesaḥ is mandatory and overrides Shabbat. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is in accordance with the view of Rabbi Yehuda, as stated previously.

Rabbi Ya’akov said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: We do not make a group for the Paschal lamb that is composed entirely of converts, because perhaps they will be overly meticulous with it and cause it to become unnecessarily disqualified. Converts can be especially zealous in their observance, and out of ignorance may cause an offering to be unnecessarily disqualified by adding extra details to the requirements of the offering.

The Sages taught in a baraita: Eating the Paschal lamb and matza and bitter herbs on the first night of Passover is mandatory. From here on, i.e., the remaining days, it is optional. Rabbi Shimon says: For men it is mandatory and for women it is optional.

The Gemara clarifies the precise intention of the last clause of the first tanna: To which part of the baraita does the halakha that eating after the first night is optional refer? If you say it is referring to the Paschal lamb, is there a Paschal lamb all seven days? Certainly not, and consequently it does not make sense to speak of whether eating it is mandatory or optional after the first night. Rather, if you say that it is referring to matza and bitter herbs, how will you say and explain accordingly the last part of the baraita, i.e., Rabbi Shimon says: For men it is mandatory and for women it is optional. If the second clause is referring only to matza and bitter herbs, then Rabbi Shimon would appear to be saying that women are exempt from eating them.

This is difficult: Does Rabbi Shimon not accept that which Rabbi Elazar said, that women are obligated in the command of eating matza by Torah law, despite the fact that it is a time-bound, positive mitzva, as it is stated: “You shall eat no leavened bread with it; seven days shall you eat matzot with it” (Deuteronomy 16:3), which teaches that all who are subject to the prohibition to not eat leavened bread are also subject to the positive mitzva to arise and eat matza? And those women, since they are subject to the prohibition to not eat leavened bread, since women are required to observe all the prohibitions of the Torah, they are subject also to the positive mitzva to arise and eat matza. Clearly, Rabbi Shimon was not referring to matza.

Rather, say instead that the baraita should be read as follows: Eating the Paschal lamb, matza, and bitter herbs on the first day of Passover is mandatory. From here on, i.e., the remaining days of Passover, it is optional to eat matza and bitter herbs. Rabbi Shimon says: The Paschal lamb is mandatory for men and optional for women, in accordance with his opinion stated previously.

MISHNA: An acute mourner, i.e., a mourner on the day of the death of an immediate relative, is prohibited from eating sacrificial food. By Torah law, the prohibition applies only to the day of death itself, but it is permitted to partake of sacrificial food on the following night. By rabbinic decree, the period of acute mourning is extended to include the night as well. Despite this, an acute mourner immerses and eats his Paschal lamb in the evening. But he may still not eat other sacrificial food. However, one who hears about the death of his dead, i.e., he discovers that one of his immediate relatives died more than thirty days after the death, his status of acute mourning applies on a rabbinic level.