דף 106

and for trapping a deer into a garden, or into a courtyard, or into an enclosure [bivar], he is liable. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Not all enclosures are identical. This is the principle: If the trapping of the animal is inadequate and it is still necessary to pursue and apprehend it, one is not liable. However, if one trapped a deer into an enclosure in which the trapping is not inadequate, he is liable.

GEMARA: We learned in the mishna there in tractate Beitza: One may not trap fish from the enclosures on a Festival, nor may one place food before them, because it is prohibited to feed an animal that may not be eaten on the Festival. However, one may trap an animal or a bird from its enclosures and slaughter them, and one may also place food before them. The Gemara raises a contradiction from that which was taught in the Tosefta: From enclosures of animals, of birds, and of fish, one may not trap on a Festival, nor may one place food before them. This is difficult due to a contradiction between the ruling with regard to an animal in the mishna and the ruling with regard to an animal in the Tosefta. This is similarly difficult due to the contradiction between the ruling with regard to birds in the mishna and the ruling with regard to birds in the Tosefta.

The Gemara says: Granted, with regard to the contradiction between the ruling concerning an animal in the mishna and the ruling concerning an animal in the Tosefta, it is not difficult, because this, the Tosefta that prohibits trapping and feeding the animals in the enclosures, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda cited in the mishna that an animal trapped into an enclosure whose trapping is inadequate, i.e., it is still necessary to pursue and apprehend the animal, is not considered trapped. That, i.e., the mishna in Beitza, which permits trapping and feeding the animals in the enclosures, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who said that animals in an enclosure are considered trapped.

However, concerning the contradiction between the ruling with regard to birds in the mishna and the ruling with regard to birds in the Tosefta, it is difficult. And if you say that the contradiction between the ruling with regard to birds in the mishna and the ruling with regard to birds in the Tosefta is also not difficult because this, the mishna, which permits trapping, is referring to a roofed enclosure, in which a bird is considered trapped, and therefore there is no prohibition against apprehending it on Shabbat; and that the Tosefta, which prohibits trapping, is referring to an unroofed enclosure in which a bird is not considered trapped and apprehending it is prohibited, that does not resolve the contradiction. As with regard to a house, which is roofed, there is no dispute, and according to both Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, trapping a bird into a closet, yes, it is considered trapped, while trapping it into a house, no, it is not considered trapped.

Rabba bar Rav Huna said: Here, in the mishna, according to which a bird in a house is not considered trapped, we are dealing with a free bird, a sparrow, because it does not accept authority. That bird is not intimidated and evades capture even in a house, as the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Why is it called a free bird [tzippor dror]? Because it dwells [dara] in a house as it does in a field. Therefore, the distinction between a roofed and unroofed enclosure resolves the apparent contradiction between the mishna and the Tosefta. The Gemara says: Now that you have arrived at this understanding, that the difference between the rulings in the two sources is predicated on different circumstances and not on a tannaitic dispute, the apparent contradiction between the ruling with regard to an animal in the mishna and the ruling with regard to an animal in the Tosefta is also not difficult. This, the ruling in the Tosefta which prohibits apprehending the animal, is referring to a large enclosure from which the animal cannot escape, but it can still avoid being apprehended. Therefore, the trapping is considered inadequate, and apprehending the animal constitutes trapping. That, the ruling in the mishna that permits apprehending the animal, is referring to a small enclosure in which the animal cannot evade its pursuers and requires no further trapping.

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a large enclosure and what are the circumstances of a small enclosure? Rav Ashi said: Any enclosure where one can run after an animal and reach it in one lunge is a small enclosure. And any other is a large enclosure. Or perhaps: Any enclosure where the shadows from the different walls fall upon each other is a small enclosure, as all enclosures had a uniform height. And any other is a large enclosure. Or perhaps: Any enclosure that does not have a series of corners in which the animal could evade capture is a small enclosure, and any other is a large enclosure.

We learned in the mishna that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Not all enclosures are identical. It depends whether the trapping of the animal is inadequate, in which case one is liable for trapping, or whether the trapping is not inadequate, in which case one is exempt. Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in this matter. Abaye said to him: If you rule the halakha in accordance with his opinion, does that mean by inference that the Rabbis disagree, or perhaps there is no dispute and everyone accepts the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel? Rav Yosef said to him: What difference is there to you whether or not the Rabbis disagree? In either case the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. He answered him using a folk expression: Is it simply learn the lesson, let it be like a song? In other words, is it sufficient to simply parrot the halakhic ruling? Rather, it is necessary to examine the issue to understand it even if it does not yield a practical halakhic difference.

The Sages taught in a baraita: One who traps a deer on Shabbat that is blind or sleeping is liable. One who traps a lame, old, or sick deer is exempt. Abaye said to Rav Yosef: What is different about these cases and what is different about those cases? Rav Yosef answered: These, the blind or sleeping deer, are likely to run away when they feel that they are being touched; therefore, they require trapping. However, these, the crippled, old, and sick deer, are not likely to run away and are therefore considered to be already trapped. The Gemara asks: Wasn’t it taught in a baraita that one who traps a sick deer is liable? Rav Sheshet said: This is not difficult. This baraita, in which a sick deer is not considered trapped and one who traps it is liable is referring to a deer that is sick due to a fever, which can still flee; that baraita, in which the deer is considered trapped and one who traps it is exempt is referring to a deer that is sick with fatigue and is incapable of fleeing.

The Sages taught in a baraita: One who traps locusts, cicadas, hornets, or mosquitoes on Shabbat is liable. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Not every insect is the same in this matter. If one traps any insect whose species is typically trapped for personal use, he is liable, and if one traps any insect whose species is typically not trapped for personal use, he is exempt. It was taught in another baraita: One who traps locusts when there is dew is exempt. Since it is cold at that time, the locusts are paralyzed. If one traps them when it is hot, he is liable. Elazar ben Mehavai says: If the locusts were swarming, one is exempt for trapping them, because no effort is necessary to apprehend them. A dilemma was raised before them: Does the statement of Elazar ben Mehavai apply to the first clause of the baraita, ruling stringently that one is liable for trapping locusts even when there is dew unless they are swarming; or does it apply to the latter clause of the baraita, ruling leniently that one is exempt when trapping locusts, even in the heat when they are swarming? Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma based on a source that addresses the point explicitly: One who traps locusts when there is dew is exempt; one who traps locusts when it is hot is liable. Elazar ben Mehavai says: Even when it is hot, if they were swarming, one is exempt.

MISHNA: If a deer entered a house on its own and one locked the door before it, he is liable for trapping. If two people locked the door, they are exempt, because neither performed a complete labor. If one person is incapable of locking the door and two people locked it, they are liable because that is the typical manner of performing that labor. And Rabbi Shimon deems them exempt as he holds that two people who perform a single labor are never liable by Torah law.

GEMARA: Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said that Shmuel said: One who traps a lion on Shabbat is not liable for trapping unless he traps it in its cage, and until that point it is not considered trapped.

MISHNA: If one person sat in the entrance of a courtyard in which there is a deer, but did not fill the entire doorway, and a second person sat and filled it, the second person is liable because he completed the labor of trapping. However, if the first person sat in the doorway and filled it, and a second person came and sat next to him, the first person is liable and the second is exempt even if the first person stood and went away, leaving the second one to secure the deer. The mishna explains: To what is this second person’s action similar? To one who locks his house to secure it, and it turns out a deer that was trapped before Shabbat is also secured inside it. In that case, he is exempt even though he enhances security on the deer, because he did not trap the animal.