דף 29

If one placed it in a box, everyone agrees that it can become ritually impure because his placing the cloth in a box indicates that he considers the cloth significant and is keeping it in order to use it. They only disagreed in a case where one hung the garment on a dryer, i.e., a stake in the wall, or where he placed it behind a door. Rabbi Eliezer held: From the fact that he did not throw it in the garbage dump, it is certainly on his mind and he is planning to use it. And what is the reason that he called it not prepared? It is because, relative to a cloth placed in a box, it is not considered prepared for use. And Rabbi Yehoshua held that since he did not place it in a box, certainly he has negated its garment status. And what is the reason that he called it prepared? Because relative to one thrown in the garbage, this garment is prepared for use, although, in fact, the cloth has already been negated. And Rabbi Akiva, in the case where he hung it on a dryer, held in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer that one has not yet negated it from use and it can therefore become ritually impure. In the case where he placed it behind a door, Rabbi Akiva held in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua that, in doing so, he negated its garment status, and it can no longer become ritually impure.

The Gemara comments: And Rabbi Akiva retracted his opinion in favor of the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua and held in accordance with his opinion. And from where do we know this? Rava said: From the term that we learned in our mishna: The wick of a garment [petilat habeged]. Why did it specifically teach: The wick of a garment? Teach that halakha using the phrase: A wick made from a garment. What is the reason that the mishna taught: A wick of a garment? It is because it remains a garment. Nevertheless, Rabbi Akiva deemed it ritually pure, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua.

MISHNA: The fundamental dispute in this mishna is with regard to the determination whether or not indirect acts of kindling and extinguishing fall within the parameters of the prohibition on Shabbat. The Rabbis said: A person may not pierce a hole in an eggshell and fill it with oil, and place it over the mouth of a lamp so that the egg will drip additional oil into the lamp and thereby extend the time that it burns. And this is the ruling even if it is not an actual egg but an earthenware vessel. And Rabbi Yehuda permits doing so. However, if the craftsman, who crafts ceramic vessels, attached the egg to the lamp from the outset, one is permitted to fill it with oil because it constitutes a single, large vessel. The Rabbis decreed that a person may not fill a bowl with oil, and place it beside the lamp, and place the unlit head of the wick into the bowl so that it draws additional oil from the bowl and thereby extend the time that the lamp burns. And Rabbi Yehuda permits doing so.

GEMARA: The Gemara comments on the fact that the mishna cited three cases that all share the same rationale: And it was necessary to cite all of the aforementioned cases because it is impossible to derive one from the other. As, had the Gemara only taught us the prohibition of an eggshell, I would have said that, specifically in that case, the Rabbis said that it is prohibited to do so. Since the egg is not dirty and disgusting, there is room for concern that one might come to take oil from it, which would be tantamount to taking oil from a burning lamp on Shabbat, because it causes the flame to be extinguished faster. However, an earthenware tube that is disgusting, say that the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Yehuda that there is no room for concern, and even according to their opinion it would be permitted. And, conversely, had the Gemara only taught us the prohibition of an earthenware tube, I would have said that, specifically in that case, Rabbi Yehuda says that one is permitted to do so because it is disgusting, as explained above; however, in that case of the eggshell that is not disgusting, say that he agrees with the Rabbis that it is prohibited. And had the Gemara taught us only those two cases of the eggshell and the earthenware tube, I would have said that, specifically in those cases, Rabbi Yehuda said that it is permitted because there is no separation between the lamp and the second receptacle. However, in the case of a bowl, which is separate, say that he agrees with the Rabbis that it is prohibited. And, conversely, had the Gemara only taught us in that case of the added bowl, I would have said that only in that case did the Rabbis say it is prohibited because it is separate. However, in these two cases of the eggshell and the ceramic tube, I would say that the Rabbis agree with Rabbi Yehuda and permit doing so. Therefore, it was necessary for the mishna to specifically state the halakha in each of the cases cited.

And we also learned in our mishna that if the craftsman attached the tube to the lamp from the outset, it is permitted to fill it with oil and use it. It was taught in a baraita that even if a homeowner attached it to the vessel before Shabbat by means of plaster or with dry potter’s clay, it is permitted. The Gemara asks: Didn’t we specifically learn in the mishna: If the craftsman attached it from the outset, not a layman? The Gemara answers: What is the meaning of craftsman in the mishna? It refers to any attachment similar to the attachment of the craftsman.

With regard to the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda said to the Rabbis: One time we spent our Shabbat in the upper story of the house of Nit’za in the city of Lod. And they brought us an eggshell, and we filled it with oil, and pierced it, and left it over the lamp in order to extend its burning. And Rabbi Tarfon and other Elders were there and they did not say anything to us. Apparently, there is no prohibition. The Rabbis said to him: Do you bring proof from there? The legal status of the Elders who were sitting in the house of Nit’za is different. They are vigilant. There is no room for concern lest they use the oil in the eggshell and accelerate the extinguishing of the lamp. However, in every other circumstance, doing so is prohibited.

The Gemara relates: Avin from the city of Tzippori dragged a bench in an upper story, whose floor was made of marble, before Rabbi Yitzḥak ben Elazar. Rabbi Yitzḥak ben Elazar said to him: If I remain silent and say nothing to you, as Rabbi Tarfon and the members of the group of Elders were silent and said nothing to Rabbi Yehuda, damage will result, as it will lead to unfounded leniency in the future. Had they told Rabbi Yehuda at that time that it is prohibited to puncture the eggshell, he would not have disagreed with the Rabbis. He would not have mistakenly derived a general leniency. So too, here the Sages issued a decree on a marble-floored upper story due to a standard upper story with an earth floor. One who drags a bench on an earth floor will create a furrow.

On the topic of dragging, the Gemara relates that the Head of the Kenesset of Batzra dragged a bench before Rabbi Yirmeya the Great on Shabbat. Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: In accordance with whose opinion do you permit yourself to drag a bench on Shabbat? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? Say that Rabbi Shimon said his statement specifically with regard to large benches that are impossible to move from place to place in any other way, but in the case of small benches did he say that one is permitted to drag them? And this disagrees with the opinion of Ulla, as Ulla said: The dispute with regard to dragging is in the case of small benches; however, in the case of large benches, everyone agrees that one is permitted to drag them, as there is no other way to move them.

Rav Yosef raised an objection from what was taught in a baraita, Rabbi Shimon says: One may drag a bed, a chair, and a bench across the floor on Shabbat even though it creates a furrow, as long as he does not intend to create a furrow. This baraita teaches about large objects, like a bed, and teaches about small objects, like a chair. If so, this is difficult for both Rabbi Yirmeya the Great and for Ulla. Rabbi Yirmeya holds that Rabbi Shimon prohibits dragging even small furniture. Ulla holds that even Rabbi Yehuda permits dragging large pieces of furniture. According to his opinion, there is no need for Rabbi Shimon to state that it is permitted.

The Gemara answers that Ulla reconciles the objection in accordance with his reasoning and Rabbi Yirmeya the Great reconciles the objection in accordance with his reasoning. The Gemara explains: Ulla reconciles the objection in accordance with his reasoning: A bed, similar to a chair; the baraita is referring here to a small bed that can be carried like a chair, with regard to which there is a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda. And Rabbi Yirmeya the Great reconciles the objection in accordance with his reasoning: A chair, similar to a bed; the baraita is referring to dragging a heavy chair that cannot be moved in any other way.

Rabba raised an objection to Rabbi Yirmeya’s statement from that which we learned in a mishna: Clothing merchants who sell garments made of diverse kinds, a prohibited mixture of wool and linen, may sell them as they normally would to gentiles, and they may place the garments that they are selling on their shoulders and need not be concerned about the prohibition against wearing diverse kinds, as long as the merchant does not intend to benefit from the garments in the sun as protection from the sun, or in the rain as protection from the rain. However, the modest people, those who are particularly fastidious in performing mitzvot, would suspend the wool and linen garments on a stick behind them. And here, in the case of dragging benches, where it is possible to act like the modest people, as the clothes are similar to small benches, and nevertheless, when one does not intend to perform the prohibited action, Rabbi Shimon permits dragging even ab initio. Rabbi Shimon holds that one who does not intend to violate a prohibition need not take an alternative course of action due to concern that resulting from his action, the prohibited act might come to be performed. Based on that principle, it is clear that Rabbi Shimon would permit dragging small benches since one does not intend to create a furrow in dragging them. This is a conclusive refutation of the statement of Rabbi Yirmeya the Great, who held that dragging small objects is prohibited according to Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, it is a conclusive refutation.

MISHNA: One who extinguishes the lamp on Shabbat because he is afraid due to gentiles, from whom he is hiding in his home, and due to thieves, or if one is afraid due to an evil spirit, i.e., he is depressed and prefers sitting in the dark, or if he extinguished the flame due to the sick person so that he will sleep, he is exempt. However, in a case where he extinguishes the flame in order to spare the lamp, spare the oil, or spare the wick, he is liable. Rabbi Yosei exempts him in all of those cases, as in his opinion no labor prohibited by Torah law is being performed by extinguishing the flame, except for the case where he seeks to spare the wick. Only in that case is extinguishing a creative action because he makes the wick into charcoal by extinguishing the flame.