דף 31

it is called hoshana, which is a term used to describe the four species. The Gemara answers: This is not a full-fledged change of name, as occasionally it also happens that they initially refer to a myrtle branch as a hoshana while it is attached to the tree.

§ The Sages taught: With regard to a stolen sukka and with regard to one who roofs a sukka in the public domain, which is tantamount to robbing land from the public, Rabbi Eliezer deems these sukkot unfit for use in fulfillment of the mitzva, and the Rabbis deem them fit.

Rav Naḥman said: This dispute is limited to a case where one assaults another and forcibly evicts him from his sukka, and takes his place in the sukka. In that case, Rabbi Eliezer deems the sukka unfit. And Rabbi Eliezer conforms to his own reasoning, as he said: A person does not fulfill his obligation with the sukka of another. Therefore, in any event, he does not fulfill his obligation with it. If land can be stolen and acquired by the robber, the sukka from which he evicted the owner is a stolen sukka. And if indeed land cannot be stolen, nevertheless, the robber does not fulfill his obligation according to Rabbi Eliezer, as it is a borrowed sukka.

And the Rabbis conform to their reasoning, as they said: A person fulfills his obligation with the sukka of another. And since land cannot be stolen and the sukka is merely a borrowed sukka and not a stolen one, the robber fulfills his obligation, despite the fact that he committed a reprehensible act.

However, if one stole wood and roofed a sukka with it, everyone agrees, as Rabbi Eliezer concedes, that the original owner of the wood has rights only to the monetary value of the wood. The wood itself belongs to the robber, so it is not a stolen sukka.

The Gemara asks: From where does Rav Naḥman draw the conclusion that the dispute is with regard to a stolen sukka and not with regard to a sukka established with stolen building materials?

The Gemara answers: From the fact that the halakha of a stolen sukka is juxtaposed in the baraita to the halakha of a sukka established in the public domain, the baraita teaches that the legal status of the stolen sukka is similar to the legal status of a sukka established in the public domain. Just as one does not fulfill his obligation with a sukka in the public domain because the land is not his, with regard to the stolen sukka too, one does not fulfill his obligation because the land is not his, not because the building materials were stolen.

The Gemara relates: There was a certain old woman who came before Rav Naḥman. She said to him: The Exilarch and all the Sages in his house have been sitting in a stolen sukka. She claimed that the Exilarch’s servants stole her wood and used it to build the sukka. She screamed, but Rav Naḥman did not pay attention to her. She said to him: A woman whose father, Abraham, our forefather, had three hundred and eighteen slaves screams before you, and you do not pay attention to her? She claimed that she should be treated with deference due to her lineage as a Jew. Rav Naḥman said to the Sages: This woman is a screamer, and she has rights only to the monetary value of the wood. However, the sukka itself was already acquired by the Exilarch.

Ravina said: With regard to the stolen large beam of a sukka, the Sages instituted an ordinance that the robber need not return it intact, due to the general ordinance of a beam. By the letter of the law, one who stole a beam and incorporated it in the construction of a new house is required to dismantle the house and return the beam. The Sages instituted an ordinance requiring the robber to repay the monetary value of the beam instead. They instituted this ordinance to facilitate the repentance of the robber, who would be less likely to repent if doing so entailed destruction of the house.

The Gemara asks: This is obvious. In what way is the beam different from other wood used in establishing the sukka? The Gemara answers: Lest you say: Wood is common, and therefore the owners are more likely to despair of recovering the wood and will suffice with receiving monetary restitution and replacing the wood, but, with regard to this large beam, which is not common, say that there is no despair, and the robber is required to return the actual beam, therefore, Ravina teaches us that the ordinance applies even to this beam, and the robber is required to return only its monetary value.

The Gemara notes: This halakha that the robber need not dismantle the sukka and return the beam applies only within the seven days of the Festival. However, after the seven days, the beam returns to the owner intact. And if the robber attached it with mortar and it is affixed permanently to the sukka, then even after the seven days of the Festival, the ordinance remains in effect, and the robber gives the original owner the monetary value of the beam.

§ It was taught in the Tosefta: A dry lulav is unfit. Rabbi Yehuda deems it fit. Rava said: The dispute is specifically with regard to a lulav, as the Rabbis hold: We liken the lulav to the etrog, based on their juxtaposition in the verse. Just as the etrog requires beauty, so too, the lulav requires beauty. And Rabbi Yehuda holds: We do not liken the lulav to the etrog. However, with regard to an etrog, everyone agrees that we require beauty [hadar] as the verse states: “Fruit of a beautiful tree” (Leviticus 23:40) and a dry etrog does not meet that criterion.

The Gemara asks: And with regard to a lulav, does Rabbi Yehuda really not require beauty? But didn’t we learn in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: With regard to a lulav whose leaves have spread out, one should bind the lulav from the top. What is the reason to do so? Is it not because he requires beauty in the case of lulav?

The Gemara rejects this: No, as the reason is taught: Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Tarfon that the same verse states: “Branches [kappot] of a date palm.” The Sages interpret the term to mean bound [kafut], indicating that if the leaves of the lulav were spread, one should bind it.

The Gemara asks: And does Rabbi Yehuda not require beauty with regard to the lulav? But didn’t we learn in a mishna: One binds the lulav only with its own species, this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda? What is the reason that Rabbi Yehuda requires the binding to be from its own species? Is it not due to the fact that he requires beauty with regard to the lulav?

The Gemara answers: No, that is not the reason, as Rava said: According to Rabbi Yehuda, one may bind the lulav even with fiber that grows around the trunk of the date palm and even with the root of the date palm, even though these do not meet the criterion of beauty. The Gemara asks: Rather, what is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda there, that a lulav must be bound with its own species? The Gemara answers: It is because he holds that a lulav requires binding, and if one brought another species to bind it, they are five species instead of four, violating the prohibition against adding to the mitzvot of the Torah.

The Gemara asks: And with regard to an etrog, does Rabbi Yehuda require beauty? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to the four species of the lulav, just as one may not diminish from their number, so too, one may not add to their number. If one did not find an etrog, he should not bring a quince, a pomegranate, or any other item instead. If the species are slightly dried, they are fit. If they are completely dry, they are unfit. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even dry etrogim are fit.

And Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident