דף 91

Ravina said that this baraita is taught with regard to an offering, and it should be explained as follows: If the court acted in accordance with their own instruction, it is as though this was a willful act of a man with a woman, and she therefore does not bring an offering, as an individual who followed the ruling of the court is exempt from bringing an offering (see Horayot 2a–b). If she married based on testimony of witnesses, it is considered as though this was an unwitting act of a man with a woman, and therefore she brings an offering.

And if you wish, say and refute Rav Sheshet’s difficulty in the following manner: This first baraita, which exempts forbidden women from a bill of divorce, is the opinion of the Rabbis, who prohibit a woman in this situation to her husband, even if she had married another based on witnesses. And you should answer the difficulty by reading the relevant clause of the baraita as follows: Apart from a married woman who married on the basis of witness testimony, and this includes one who married by permission of the court, as she too requires a bill of divorce.

§ Ulla raised an objection against Rav Sheshet’s reasoning: Do we say this justification: What could she have done? Is a woman considered to have acted under duress when she had no way to avoid sin? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Gittin 79b): If a man wrote a bill of divorce and dated it according to a kingdom that is not suitable [hogenet], i.e., one that does not reign over their place of residence; or according to the kingdom of Media or according to the kingdom of Greece, which are no longer in existence; or if he dated it according to the building of the Temple or according to the destruction of the Temple; and similarly if the bill of divorce was given in the east and he wrote in it a place in the west, or in the west and he wrote a place in the east, this bill of divorce is invalid.

Consequently, if she married another man she must leave this one and that one, both the one who gave her the bill of divorce and the new husband. And all these matters mentioned in the mishna here, the penalties imposed on a married woman who remarried unlawfully, apply to her. The Gemara asks: But why? Let us say: What could she have done. She acted under duress, as she married again only because she thought the bill of divorce was valid. The Gemara answers: This woman did not act under duress, as she should have had the bill of divorce read by a scholar, who would have told her that it was invalid.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: Come and hear a different proof. With regard to one who married his yevama, and the rival wife of the yevama went and married someone else, and this yevama was later discovered to be a sexually underdeveloped woman, which means that she was never eligible for levirate marriage and therefore her act of intercourse did not exempt her rival wife from levirate marriage, the rival wife must leave this one and that one, i.e., her husband must give her a bill of divorce and she may not marry the yavam, and all these matters apply to her. But why? Again, let us say: What could she have done. The Gemara answers: This is no proof, as she should have waited until it was clearly established that the other wife was not a sexually underdeveloped woman.

Abaye said: Come and hear: With regard to all those with whom relations are forbidden, with regard to whom the Sages said that they exempt their rival wives, if these rival wives went and married, and one of these forbidden women was discovered to be a sexually underdeveloped woman, which means that the obligation of levirate marriage did not apply to her at all, and it was the rival wives who should have performed levirate marriage, the rival wife must leave both this and that, and all these matters apply to her. But why? Let us say: What could she have done. The Gemara answers as before: She should have waited.

Rava said: Come and hear: A scribe wrote a bill of divorce for the man and a receipt for the woman, so that the man should give the bill of divorce to his wife and she should give him the receipt upon his delivery of the marriage contract. And the scribe erred and gave the bill of divorce to the woman and the receipt to the man, leaving them with the mistaken impression that he had the bill of divorce and she the receipt, and they gave each other the documents, this one to that one and that one to this one.

And after a while it became clear that the bill of divorce is in the man’s possession and the receipt in the woman’s possession, and no act of divorce had been performed at all. If the woman had married someone else in the meantime she must leave both this one and that one, and all these matters apply to her. But why? Let us say: What could she have done. The Gemara answers: Here too, she should have had the bill of divorce read by an expert.

Rav Ashi said: Come and hear: If a man changed his name, or his wife’s name, or the name of his city, or the name of her city, and she remarried, she must leave both this one and that one, and all these matters apply to her. But why? Let us say: What could she have done. The Gemara answers: Once again, she should have had the bill of divorce read by a scholar.

Ravina said: Come and hear: A man married a woman on the basis that she was divorced. However, she had actually received a bare bill of divorce, i.e., missing a signature. This is referring to a special type of bill of divorce, one that was folded and sewn up. It requires as many witnesses as the number of lines it contains. If a bill of divorce of this kind does not have enough witnesses, it is invalid. In the case of the baraita, if this woman married another man after receiving this bill of divorce, she must leave both this one and this one, and all these penalties apply to her. Again, the question is: What could she have done? The Gemara answers, as before: She should have had the bill of divorce read by someone who could have told her it was invalid.

The Gemara relates: Rav Pappa thought to take action and permit a woman to return to her husband based on the rationale: What could she have done. In a case where she had no means of clarifying the matter, he ruled that she should be considered to have acted under duress. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said to Rav Pappa: But isn’t it taught repeatedly in all these mishnayot that this argument is not accepted?

Rav Pappa said to Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua: And did we not resolve these mishnayot, by explaining that in those particular cases she did have the option of clarifying the matter? He said to him: And shall we stand and rely on answers? Admittedly, we found some way of resolving these questions, but the accumulation of difficulties indicates that the rationale: What could she have done, is unacceptable. And indeed, Rav Pappa ceased to follow his original intention and did not issue a lenient ruling.

§ The Gemara discusses the case of the mishna from another perspective. Rav Ashi said: And we are not concerned about a rumor. In other words, if there was an unsubstantiated rumor that the husband was alive, the court takes no notice of it. The Gemara asks: Which kind of rumor does he mean? If we say that this is referring to a rumor that spread after the marriage of this woman to another man, Rav Ashi has already said this once, as Rav Ashi said: