Group None

and the middle ruin is prohibited to both of them.

Rav Beruna sat and stated this halakha in the name of Rav. Rabbi Elazar, a student of the Torah academy, said to him: Did Rav actually say this? Rav Beruna said to him: Yes, he did. He said to him: Show me his place of lodging, and I will go and ask him myself. He showed him where Rav lived. Rabbi Elazar came before Rav and said to him: Did the Master actually say this? He said to him: Yes, I did.

Rabbi Elazar then said to Rav: Since you prohibit using the middle ruin, you evidently maintain that one person renders it prohibited for another by way of the air. That being the case, it must be that you permit the resident of each house to use the adjacent ruin because one’s use of the ruin, while not convenient for him, is more convenient than the other person’s usage. But wasn’t it the Master himself who said: With regard to a place that can be used by the residents of the one courtyard only by lowering an object down to it and by the residents of another courtyard only by throwing an object on top of it, so that neither courtyard has convenient access to it, both sets of residents are prohibited from using it, although lowering an object is more convenient than throwing it?

Rav said to him: Do you think that we are dealing with a case of three ruins positioned alongside each other in a straight line? No. They are arranged in the form of a tripod, i.e. in a triangular form. In other words, two of the ruins, each adjacent to one of the houses, are located next to each other; the third is positioned adjacent to one side of the other two, near both houses. The middle ruin is prohibited to the residents of both houses because both houses have equally inconvenient but direct access to it. However, each of the other ruins is permitted to the resident of the adjacent house, as he has direct access to it, while the resident of the other house can reach it only through the air of the ruin nearest to him, and Rav maintains that one person does not render it prohibited for use by another by way of the air.

Rav Pappa said to Rava: Let us say that Shmuel, who maintains that one renders it prohibited for another by way of the air, does not agree with the opinion of Rav Dimi. When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A place less than four by four handbreadths in size is an exempt domain with respect to carrying on Shabbat. Consequently, if this place is located between a public domain and a private domain, it is permitted for both the people in the public domain and the people in the private domain to adjust the burden on their shoulders in it, as long as they do not exchange objects with each other by way of the exempt domain. According to Shmuel’s opinion this should be prohibited due to the air of a different domain.

Rava replied: There, Rabbi Yoḥanan is dealing with an exempt domain situated between a public domain and a private domain, the two existing domains by Torah law. In that case, the Sages did not prohibit the use of the place due to the air. By contrast, here, with regard to the air between private domains, we are dealing with domains between which carrying is prohibited by rabbinic law, and the Sages reinforced their statements even more than those of the Torah; they added preventive measures in order to safeguard their decrees. Consequently, according to Shmuel, the Sages indeed decreed that one renders it prohibited for another by way of the air.

Ravina said to Rava: But did Rav actually say this, that one person does not render it prohibited for use by another by way of the air? But wasn’t it stated that amora’im disagreed with regard to two houses belonging to one person that stood on two opposite sides of a public domain. Rabba bar Rav Huna said that Rav said: It is prohibited to throw an object from one house to the other; and Shmuel said that it is permitted to throw from one to the other. Rav apparently forbade the act of throwing due to the prohibited air of the public domain that lies between the two houses.

Rava said to him: Wasn’t it established that one house was relatively higher and the other one was lower than the first? Rav prohibited throwing from one domain to the other, not due to the air of the public domain, but rather due to the difficulty of throwing from a low place to a higher one, as the thrown object might sometimes roll and fall back into the public domain and people might come to pick it up and carry it from the public domain to the private domain. It was for this reason that Rav prohibited throwing an object from one house to another.

MISHNA: With regard to one who placed his eiruv of courtyards in a gatehouse or in a portico, a roofed structure without walls or with incomplete walls, or one who deposited it in a balcony, this is not a valid eiruv. And one who resides there, in any of these structures, does not render it prohibited for the homeowner and the other residents of the courtyard to carry, even if he did not contribute to the eiruv.

If, however, one deposited his eiruv in a hay shed or in a cowshed or in a woodshed or in a storehouse, this is a valid eiruv, as it is located in a properly guarded place. And one who resides there with permission, if he neglected to contribute to the eiruv, he renders it prohibited for the homeowner and the other residents of the courtyard to carry. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the homeowner has there, in the hay shed or the other places listed above, a right of usage, i.e., if he is entitled to use all or part of the area for his own purposes, then the one who lives there does not render it prohibited for the homeowner, as the area is considered the homeowner’s quarters, and the person living there is classified as a member of his household.

GEMARA: Rav Yehuda, son of Rav Shmuel bar Sheilat, said: Any place with regard to which the Sages said that one who resides there does not render it prohibited for the other residents of the courtyard to carry, one who places his eiruv there, his is not a valid eiruv, except for a gatehouse that belongs to an individual. If a structure is used as a passageway by only one person, he does not render it prohibited for the other residents of the courtyard, and an eiruv placed there is a valid eiruv. And any place with regard to which the Sages said that a joining of courtyards may not be placed there, a merging of alleyways may be placed there, except for the airspace of an alleyway, which is not inside one of the courtyards.

The Gemara asks: What is he teaching us by this? We have already learned this in the mishna: With regard to one who placed his eiruv in a gatehouse or in a portico or in a balcony, it is not a valid eiruv. It can be inferred from the mishna that an eiruv, it is not, a merging of the alleyway, it is. What, then, is novel in this statement?

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for him to teach the halakha of a gatehouse that belongs to an individual and the halakha of the airspace of an alleyway, which we did not learn in the mishna. This was also taught in a baraita: One who placed his eiruv in a gatehouse, or in a portico, or in a balcony, or in a courtyard, or in an alleyway, this is a valid eiruv. But didn’t we learn in the mishna that this is not an eiruv? Rather, you must say that the baraita should read: This is a valid merging of the alleyway.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But if one places the food of the merging of the alleyway in the alleyway itself, it is not properly guarded, which means that it is as though he has not placed the merging of the alleyway there at all. Rather, you must say that the baraita should read: If he placed his merging of the alleyway in a courtyard in the alleyway, it is valid.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: If there were a group of people who were dining together on Shabbat eve, and the day became sanctified for them, i.e., Shabbat began while they were eating, they may rely upon the bread on the table for an eiruv of courtyards, so that they are all permitted to carry in the courtyard. And some say they may rely on the bread for a merging of the alleyway.

Rabba said: The two versions do not disagree with regard to whether the bread counts as an eiruv or a merging of the alleyway. Rather, here, the teaching that states it can be used as an eiruv, is referring to a case where they are dining in the house, as food deposited in a house can be used as an eiruv for the courtyard. By contrast, there it is referring to a situation where they are dining in the courtyard, and they may therefore rely on the bread only as a merging of the alleyway but not as an eiruv.

Abaye said to Rabba: A baraita was taught that supports you. Joinings of courtyards are deposited in a courtyard, and mergings of alleyways are placed in an alleyway. And we discussed this baraita and raised a difficulty: How can it be that eiruvin of courtyards are deposited in a courtyard? But didn’t we learn in the mishna: If one deposited his eiruv in a gatehouse, or in a portico, or in a balcony it is not a valid eiruv? The mishna clearly indicates that the eiruv may not be deposited in the airspace of a courtyard. Rather, you must say that the baraita should read as follows: Eiruvin of a courtyard are placed in a house in that courtyard; whereas mergings of alleyways are placed in a courtyard that opens into that alleyway.

We learned in the mishna that Rabbi Yehuda says: If the homeowner has there, in the hay shed or one of the other places listed, a right of usage, the person living there does not render the courtyard prohibited. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of a right of usage? The Gemara answers: For example, the courtyard of a man named Bonyas, an extremely wealthy individual who allowed various people to take up residence on his property, and he kept some of his many possessions in the living quarters assigned to those people. As he retained the right to remove his articles from their apartments, those areas continued to be regarded as quarters belonging to Bonyas and the people living there were deemed members of his household.

The Gemara relates another incident involving Bonyas and his wealth: The son of Bonyas came before Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Realizing from his visitor’s clothing that he was dealing with a wealthy individual, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to his attendants: Make way for one who possesses one hundred maneh, i.e., one hundred times one hundred zuz, as one of this status deserves to be honored in accordance with his riches. Later, another person came before him, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi once again turned to his attendants and said to them: