דף 73

“I have given you the priesthood as a service of gift; and the stranger that comes near shall be put to death” (Numbers 18:7). This verse is found in the context of the priestly gifts, including teruma, and comes to teach us that they made the eating of teruma in the outlying areas, i.e., outside the Temple, like the service of the Temple.

We learned in our mishna that if one unwittingly slaughtered the Paschal lamb on Shabbat for those who cannot eat it or for those who did not register for it, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: It is obvious. Since there, with regard to the slaughter itself, it is invalid, here, with regard to Shabbat, he is liable, for it turns out that he performed a prohibited labor that was not necessary for sacrificing an offering. The Gemara answers: Since the latter clause of the mishna taught cases in which he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, the first clause taught cases in which he is liable, even though it does not really teach us anything new.

The Gemara asks: But this also is obvious, since there, the offering is valid, here with regard to Shabbat he is exempt, as the slaughter did not involve a desecration of Shabbat. Rather, since the mishna taught the case of one who slaughtered the Paschal lamb for a different purpose on Shabbat, it also taught the case of one who slaughtered it for those who cannot eat it. The Gemara asks further: And it itself, the case of slaughtering the Paschal offering for a different purpose, why do I need it? The halakha there is also obvious. The Gemara answers: Since the mishna wished to teach the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua, it taught all these other halakhot as well.

The Gemara relates that Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana said to his son: When you go before Rabbi Zerika, ask him: According to the opinion that says that one who inflicts a destructive wound is exempt, i.e., that one who causes a wound on Shabbat that has no constructive effect but rather is purely destructive in nature has not performed a prohibited labor and is therefore exempt from bringing a sin-offering, how are we to understand the mishna’s ruling that one who slaughtered the Paschal lamb for those who cannot eat it is liable? Since the slaughter is invalid, he should be seen as having wounded the animal in a way that brings no benefit and is simply destructive. What has he improved through the slaughter that he should be liable for having performed a prohibited labor?

The Gemara answers: He has improved it in that if the sacrificial parts of the offering ascended to the top of the altar, they do not descend. The halakha is that if the sacrificial parts of a disqualified offering are inadvertently brought up to the top of the altar, they need not be removed and they may be burned on the altar. Thus, the slaughter had some constructive effect.

The Gemara asks further: We learned in the mishna that if one slaughtered the Paschal lamb and it was found to have a blemish, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. Here too, it may be asked: What has he improved through the slaughter, so that he should be liable? The Gemara answers: He has improved it if the blemish was small, e.g., if it was on the animal’s eyelid, and in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who said that in the case of an offering with such a small blemish, if its sacrificial parts ascended to the top of the altar, they do not descend from it, because it is not a disgrace to the altar for the sacrificial parts of such an offering to be burned on it.

We learned in the next clause of our mishna that if one slaughtered the Paschal lamb and it was found to have a hidden condition that would cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa], he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. The mishna’s wording indicates that if the animal’s condition is visible, its owner is liable. It may be asked: What has he improved by slaughtering an animal with a such a condition? The Gemara answers: He has improved it in that he removed it from the category of an animal carcass [neveila], i.e., an animal that died of natural causes or as the result of an improperly carried out act of ritual slaughter. Had the animal died on its own it would have been treated as a neveila, which is a primary source of ritual impurity, rendering those who touch or carry it ritually impure. Proper slaughter of the animal prevents it from falling into that category and imparting ritual impurity.

Ravina strongly objects to this: With regard to that which was taught elsewhere in a baraita, that one who unwittingly slaughters a sin-offering on Shabbat outside the Temple for the sake of idolatry is liable to bring three sin-offerings for it: For desecrating Shabbat, for slaughtering an offering outside the Temple, and for practicing idolatry; here too, the question may be raised: What has he improved by slaughtering the animal? Here we cannot answer that he removed it from the category of an animal carcass and prevented it from becoming a primary source of ritual impurity, because any animal that was used as an idolatrous offering imparts ritual impurity. Therefore, it would seem that the slaughter served no constructive purpose.

Rav Avira said: Even here he has improved it in that he removed it from the category of limbs from a living creature. Even a gentile is liable if he eats meat taken from a living animal, but once the animal is slaughtered there is no longer any liability. Accordingly, even this act of slaughter has achieved a productive result.

We learned in the mishna that if one slaughtered the Paschal lamb and it became known afterward that the owners had died, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering. Rav Huna said that Rav said: Regarding a guilt-offering that was consigned to grazing: If the owner of a guilt-offering dies or achieves atonement through a different guilt-offering, the animal is sent out to graze in the field until it develops a blemish, at which point it can be sold. The money from the sale is used to purchase a burnt-offering. And if, before it developed a blemish, someone slaughtered it without specifying its purpose, it is valid as a burnt-offering. The Gemara concludes that Rav apparently holds that it does not require uprooting. There is no need for an explicit declaration in order to change the status of the offering; even if it is slaughtered without its purpose specified it is valid.

The Gemara asks: If so, even when it has not yet been consigned to grazing, it should also be valid, for any guilt-offering whose owner has achieved atonement through a different offering is presumably going to be brought as a free-will burnt-offering. The Gemara answers: This invalidation stems from a rabbinic decree with regard to a guilt-offering after its owner achieved atonement with a different offering due to concern about a guilt-offering before its owner achieved atonement with a different offering. Before the owner achieves atonement the animal is certainly considered a guilt-offering; it is only after the owner achieves atonement that the offering becomes valid for use as a burnt-offering, and then by strict halakha it is immediately valid for that purpose, even before the animal develops a blemish.

From where do you say that this is the case? As we learned elsewhere in a mishna: A guilt-offering whose owner has died or whose owner has achieved atonement through a different guilt-offering grazes until it becomes unfit, whereupon it is sold and its money is used for a communal free-will burnt-offering. Rabbi Eliezer says: This guilt-offering is made to die on its own. Rabbi Yehoshua says: When it develops a blemish, it is sold, and he brings a burnt-offering for himself with its money.

This indicates that according to Rabbi Yehoshua, as soon as the owner achieves atonement, his animal loses its status as a guilt-offering and it becomes a burnt-offering. Nevertheless, even he says that the animal that is bought with its money may indeed be brought as a burnt-offering, but the guilt-offering itself must not be sacrificed as a burnt-offering. Undoubtedly, his reason must be that the Sages issued a decree with regard to a guilt-offering after its owner achieved atonement with a different offering, due to concern about a guilt-offering before its owner achieved atonement with a different offering. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from it that this is correct.

Rav Ḥisda raised an objection to Rav Huna with regard to his opinion about uprooting the status of an offering from what we learned in our mishna: If one slaughtered a Paschal lamb on Shabbat and afterward it became known that the owners had withdrawn from it and registered for a different one, or that they had died or become ritually impure, he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering, because he slaughtered with permission.