דף 6

in a case where the offspring was sick on Shavuot, and therefore it could be brought to the altar only on the next Festival. Rav Ashi said an alternative explanation: What is the statement: And we ate its offspring as a peace-offering on the Festival, coming to teach? This is not referring to the festival of Sukkot, which is the usual meaning of the term the Festival; rather, it is referring to the festival of Shavuot. Therefore, there is no difficulty here whatsoever.

The Gemara asks: And what does the other amora, Rav Zevid, say to this? He argues that anywhere that the tanna teaches a halakha concerning Passover using the term Pesaḥ, he teaches the halakha concerning Shavuot using the term Atzaret, not the term Ḥag. In such a context, the term Ḥag is reserved exclusively for Sukkot.

Rava said: Once three Festivals have passed, every day he transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay. The Gemara raises an objection from that which is taught in the following baraita: In the case of both a firstborn animal and all consecrated animals, once a year has passed without three Festivals, or three Festivals have passed without a year elapsing, the owner transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay.

The Gemara first expresses its astonishment at the question itself: What is this objection? What is the comparison between this ruling and the statement of Rava? Rav Kahana said: He who raises an objection here raises a valid objection, and this is the way the question should be understood. Since the tanna of the baraita is looking for prohibitions to add, and he shows that the prohibition applies in additional cases, then if Rava is correct, let the tanna of the baraita teach that once three Festivals have passed he transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay, every single day.

And how does the other amora, Rava, explain the baraita? He understands that the tanna is trying to establish the action only as subject to a prohibition, i.e., he merely wishes to set the parameters of the prohibition; but once the action is established as prohibited, he is not looking for additional prohibitions.

The Gemara proceeds to discuss the matter itself, i.e., the baraita cited above, which stated: In the case of both a firstborn animal and all consecrated animals, once a year has passed, even if three Festivals have not passed, or once three Festivals have passed, even if a whole year has not passed, the owner transgresses the prohibition: You shall not delay. Granted, it is possible to have three Festivals without a year; you find it because three Festivals can pass in half a year, between Passover and Sukkot. But a year without three Festivals, under what circumstances can you find this case? How can a year pass without three Festivals also passing?

The Gemara clarifies the question: This works out well according to the one who is of the opinion that one transgresses the prohibition against delaying only if the three Festivals have passed in their proper order. You can find a year without three Festivals in their proper order, e.g., if one made his vow shortly before Shavuot, in which case the year will end before Shavuot the following year, but three Festivals in order will not have elapsed until Sukkot of the third year. But according to the one who is not of the opinion that the three Festivals must be in their proper order, under what circumstances can you find this case of a year without three Festivals?

The Gemara clarifies again: Granted, according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, you find a year without three Festivals in a leap year, as it is taught in a baraita: In the case of houses of walled cities, with regard to which an owner is given only one year to redeem his home if he sells it, after which it becomes the permanent possession of the purchaser, the verse states: “And if it be not redeemed within the space of a full year” (Leviticus 25:30). How is the year determined? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: One counts 365 days like the number of the days in a solar year, and not the usual lunar year, which is why it is called a full year.

And the Rabbis disagree and say: One counts twelve months from day to day, from the date of the sale until that same date twelve months later, and if it is a leap year with an added month, the leap month is for the seller’s benefit, i.e., he has thirteen months to redeem his house. You can find a year without three Festivals according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. How so? It is possible in a case where one consecrated the animal after the festival of Passover, so that once he reaches the end of the second month of Adar in a leap year, the year is completed, but the Festivals are not yet completed, as the third Festival is still to come. But according to the Sages, under what circumstances can you find this case of a year without three Festivals?

The Gemara answers: As Rav Shemaya taught in a baraita: Shavuot sometimes occurs on the fifth of Sivan, sometimes on the sixth of Sivan, and sometimes on the seventh. How so? If both the months of Nisan and Iyyar are full months of thirty days each, the festival of Shavuot, which is celebrated fifty days after the second day of Passover, occurs on the fifth of Sivan; if both months are short, with twenty-nine days each, it occurs on the seventh of Sivan; and if one of them is full and the other is short, it occurs on the sixth of Sivan. According to this opinion, if both months were full and the festival of Shavuot occurred on the fifth day of Sivan, and one made his vow on the day after Shavuot, i.e., the sixth of Sivan, and in the following year both months were short, so that the festival of Shavuot occurred on the seventh of Sivan, a whole year would have passed without three Festivals.

The Gemara comments: And who is the tanna who disagrees with Rav Shemaya and says that a year has a fixed number of days? It is Aḥerim, as it is taught in a baraita: Aḥerim say: The difference between Shavuot of one year and Shavuot of the following year, and similarly, between Rosh HaShana of one year and Rosh HaShana of the following year, is only four days of the week. There are 354 days in a lunar year, which are divided into twelve alternating months, six months that are thirty days long and six months that are twenty-nine days long. Therefore, every year is fifty weeks and four days long. And if it were a leap year, in which case the year is comprised of 383 days, or fifty-four weeks and five days, there is a difference of five days between them.

§ Rabbi Zeira asks: In the case of an heir, what is the halakha with regard to the prohibition of: You shall not delay? That is to say, does an heir transgress the prohibition against delaying a vow taken by his father? The Gemara explains the two sides of the question: Is it that the Merciful One states in the Torah: “When you shall vow a vow to the Lord your God, you shall not delay paying it” (Deuteronomy 23:22), and this one, the heir, did not make a vow? Or perhaps the essence of the mitzva is as it says: “And there you shall come; and there you shall bring your burnt-offerings and your sacrifices” (Deuteronomy 12:5–6), and this one, the heir, is obligated to come and bring his father’s offerings.

Come and hear an answer to this, as Rabbi Ḥiyya taught a baraita that says: The verse states: “For the Lord your God will surely require it from you” (Deuteronomy 23:22), which is interpreted to mean: To the exclusion of an heir. This teaches that an heir does not transgress the prohibition against delaying a vow taken by his father.

The Gemara asks: But this phrase “from you” is necessary to teach a different halakha, namely, that one transgresses the prohibition against delaying even for gleanings, forgotten sheaves, and the produce of the corner of his field. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Ḥiyya derived two halakhot from this word. He read into the verse: “You [imakh],” which he expounded as coming to include gleanings, forgotten sheaves and the produce of the corner of the field in the prohibition, and he read into the verse: “From you [me’imakh],” with the extra letter mem coming to exclude an heir.

§ Rabbi Zeira asks another question on this topic: In the case of a woman who made a vow, what is the halakha with regard to the prohibition: You shall not delay? The Gemara explains: Do we say that since she is not obligated to appear in the Temple on the pilgrimage Festivals, as this obligation is a positive, time-bound mitzva, from which women are exempt, she also does not transgress if she is late in bringing her offering? Or perhaps, since she is obligated in the mitzva of rejoicing on a Festival, she should also be obligated in some of the other mitzvot connected to the day?

Abaye said to him: Derive this from the fact that she is also obligated in the mitzva of rejoicing on a Festival. The Gemara asks: And did Abaye actually say this, that a woman is obligated to rejoice on a Festival? But didn’t Abaye say: As for a woman, her husband must make her joyful on a Festival? This means that the obligation falls not on the woman, but upon her husband. The Gemara answers: Abaye stated his opinion in accordance with the statement of Rabbi Zeira. Rabbi Zeira holds that women are bound by a positive mitzva to rejoice on a Festival. Since, according to Rabbi Zeira’s opinion, they are obligated in the mitzva of rejoicing on a Festival, they are also subject to the prohibition: You shall not delay.

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In the case of a firstborn animal, from when does one begin to count a year with regard to the prohibition against delaying? Abaye said: One counts from the time it is born. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said: One counts from the time it is fit for appeasement, i.e., from its eighth day, when it is fit to be brought as an offering, as explicitly stated in the Torah (see Leviticus 22:27).

The Gemara comments: The two Sages do not disagree. This one, Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov, who said that one counts from the time that the animal is fit for appeasement, is speaking about an unblemished firstborn, which must be brought to the altar for sacrifice.